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I. INTRODUCTION 
Separation of church and state is supposed to be dead, or at least 
dying. It became the guiding principle of the Supreme Court’s 
religion jurisprudence in the 1940s, increased in importance through 
the 1970s until it dominated the Court’s religion jurisprudence, and 
then began a slow decline in the 1980s as the conservative Justices 
exploited its historical and conceptual weaknesses to tear it down. In 
its place, the Court has erected a neutrality regime that allows 
government both to regulate and to subsidize religion so long as it 
does so for secular reasons and remains religiously neutral. 
Most discussion of separationism assumes the above narrative, 
and for good reason. It accurately captures the broad trends of the 
Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence and successfully explains 
them in both doctrinal and political terms. Yet there remain aspects 
of the Court’s religion jurisprudence that fit this narrative 
awkwardly, if at all—aspects highlighted by the Court’s decision in 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 
which was both unanimous and thoroughly separationist. 
Because scholars lack a consensus understanding of separationism 
as a concept, they have not fully appreciated the ways in which the 
separationism of the 1970s differed from the separationism that 
preceded it. They have also not noticed that the ways in which the 
Court’s jurisprudence today, whether it uses the word “separation” 
or not, resembles the separationism that guided the Court’s religion 
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jurisprudence in its earlier decades. It is a separationism at once new 
and very old. 
The common thread running through this history is the Court’s 
concern for the development of religious belief free from 
government involvement or interference. In Free Exercise 
jurisprudence, this concern has led to special protections for 
individual religious belief, religious speech, and organizations that 
teach religious principles. In Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it 
has led to a requirement that any government action benefitting 
religious people or organizations must have a non-religious purpose 
and must be religiously neutral, whether they are distributed to 
religious organizations directly or through the free choice of private 
parties. The abandonment of the 1970s’ approach to separationism 
has not been a repudiation of separationism itself, but of a particular 
approach to separationism—one that was only ascendant for perhaps 
two decades, one based on dubious assumptions and leading to 
untenable outcomes. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part II elaborates on the 
traditional narrative of separationism’s rise and fall before explaining 
this narrative’s greatest flaw: its lack of any shared definition of 
separationism, which has obscured the separationist character of 
certain aspects of the Court’s recent religion jurisprudence—in 
particular, the committed separationism of Hosanna-Tabor. Part III 
traces the contours of this new separationism in Free Exercise 
doctrine, tying it to the Court’s early Free Exercise separationism 
and distinguishing both of them from the separationism of Sherbert 
and Yoder. 
Parts IV and V investigate the Court’s new separationism in one 
aspect of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, namely, aid to 
religious organizations. Part IV argues that the end of the 
“pervasively sectarian” doctrine and of the Court’s efforts to ban aid 
that can be put to religious purposes, often considered signs of 
separationism’s decline, are in fact consistent with its early 
separationist jurisprudence and a departure only from problematic 
doctrines articulated in the 1970s. Part V makes the same argument 
with respect to the Court’s willingness to allow indirect aid to 
religious organizations, or in other words, aid distributed by the free 
choice of private individuals. Part VI concludes. 
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II. THE FLAWED STORY OF SEPARATIONISM’S FALL 
The conventional wisdom that the Supreme Court has 
repudiated separationism consists of two broadly shared 
understandings. First, the conventional wisdom understands the 
Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence from 1940 until 1980 as a 
continuous effort—if sometimes a timid and confused one—to build 
a wall that would separate government and religion as much as 
possible. Second, it sees the Court’s religion jurisprudence since 
1980 as abandoning this effort and dismantling the wall. 
Variations on this basic narrative are expressed or assumed in the 
work of numerous legal scholars and other commentators. To some 
commentators, it is a happy story: separationism was incoherent to 
begin with,1 or anti-egalitarian,2 or anti-religious,3 or just a pointless 
barrier to government subsidies of valuable private schools and 
charities.4 To others, it is a tragedy: separationism protected religious 
liberty,5 reduced religious strife, kept government out of the inner 
workings of religious organizations,6 and advanced, however 
imperfectly, the ideal of government based on public reason in which 
all citizens can participate. But, happy or sad, the erection and 
dismantling of a wall of separation is the story most commentators 
assume when they discuss the subject, with only a few questioning 
whether recent doctrinal changes might actually be consistent with 
the separation of church and state,7 or whether the Supreme Court 
remains committed to some aspects of separationism.8 
 
 1. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (2007). 
 2. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008). 
 3. RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984). 
 4. Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Co-operation with Faith-
based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1 (1997). 
 5. Steven K. Green, Of (Un)Equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance 
Between Neutrality and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (2002) (“Neutrality has 
emerged victorious from the doctrinal fray while separationism, which has been on the ropes 
for two decades, is apparently down for the count.”). 
 6. William P. Marshall, Remembering the Values of Separatism and State Funding of 
Religious Organizations (Charitable Choice): To Aid is Not Necessarily to Protect, 18 J.L. & 
POL. 479 (2002). 
 7. See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 
EMORY L.J. 43, 46, 48 (1997). 
 8. See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
230 (1994). 
HURST.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:13 PM 
1 The Very Old New Separationism 
 5 
The following sections serve three purposes. First, Section II.A 
summarizes the conventional narrative in more detail. Then Section 
II.B argues that the conventional narrative overstates the extent to 
which the Supreme Court has abandoned separationism. In 
particular, it argues that Hosanna-Tabor was a perfect test case for 
the conventional wisdom that neutrality now dominates the Court’s 
religion jurisprudence—a test case that separationism resoundingly 
won. Finally, Section II.C argues that the reason scholars have not 
universally appreciated the Supreme Court’s continued separationist 
commitments is that scholars lack a universally shared understanding 
of what separationism is. This Article tries to ameliorate this problem 
by listing a few assumptions common to all understandings of 
separationism and calling attention to the key issue on which they 
differ: their definition of the church from which the state needs to 
be separated. 
A. The Conventional Narrative 
Although the phrase “separation between church and State” first 
appeared in a Supreme Court opinion in 1878,9 histories of the 
Court’s separationism usually begin in the 1940s with the 
incorporation of the Religion Clauses. In the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
cases10 and United States v. Ballard,11 the Court began establishing a 
religious sphere protected from government influence—or, as the 
Court put it in Cantwell v. Connecticut, establishing a “shield 
[beneath which] many types of life, character, opinion and belief can 
develop unmolested and unobstructed.”12 In Everson v. Board of 
Education, the Court determined that the government must abstain 
from promoting religion as well as from interfering with it, and 
Cantwell’s shield became a wall.13 
In the following decades, the Court continued to invoke the idea 
of separation and the wall metaphor to limit government interaction 
 
 9. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
 10. See generally Patrick J. Flynn, “Writing their Faith into the Laws of the Land”: 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Supreme Court’s Battle for the Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, 
1939–1945, 10 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1 (2004). 
 11. United States. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
 12. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). 
 13. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
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with religion under both Religion Clauses.14 Yet (the narrative goes) 
the Court’s separationism was fickle and inconsistent even in its 
golden age. In Everson itself, the Court declared in emphatic tones 
that it “could not approve the slightest breach” in the wall of 
separation, while refusing in the same paragraph to strike down a 
subsidy for parochial students’ bus fares15—leading Justice Jackson to 
remark that the Court, “whispering ‘I will ne’er consent,’—
consented.”16 In the Court’s first Establishment Clause case after 
Everson, it forbade schools from allowing private religious instruction 
on campus during school time,17 only to permit a nearly identical 
program four years later.18 
Nevertheless, the Court’s separationism grew stricter with time, 
and in the 1960s and 1970s, it articulated general statements of the 
requirements of the Religion Clauses that were strictly separationist. 
In 1963’s Sherbert v. Verner and 1972’s Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court 
declared that laws may not burden religious exercise unless doing so 
is justified by a “compelling state interest.”19 In 1971, the Court in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman held that no government action is permissible 
unless its primary purpose is secular, its primary effect neither 
advances nor inhibits religion, and the action avoids excessive 
entanglement between government and religion.20 In the following 
decade, the Court used this three-prong test to strictly limit 
 
 14. E.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am., 344 
U.S. 94, 109 (1952) (Free Exercise); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 
(1948) (Establishment). 
 15. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. 
 16. Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ROGER 
K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK 363 (1994) (“[Justice Black’s majority opinion in Everson] drew 
criticism from all quarters. Black’s rhetoric and dicta contrasted too sharply with his conclusion 
and holding to satisfy anyone.”). 
 17. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 203. 
 18. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (majority distinguishing McCollum based 
on whether the religious instruction took place on school property); id. at 315 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (dissenters arguing that the majority’s decision was inconsistent with McCollum). 
For a history of the two decisions, see James E. Zucker, Note, Better a Catholic than a 
Communist: Reexamining McCollum v. Board of Education and Zorach v. Clauson, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 2069 (2007) (arguing that the shift from McCollum to Zorach can largely be explained by 
a growing fear of atheism and communism). 
 19. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 438 (1963)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
 20. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
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government aid to religious schools21 and to strike down Ten 
Commandments displays in public schools.22 
By 1980, separationism seemed ascendant, and it had become 
identified with the set of issues most people still associate with it 
today: keeping religious exercises out of public schools, limiting 
subsidies to religious private schools, restricting government 
religious speech, and so forth. In Free Exercise jurisprudence, 
separationist principles supported doctrines that provided—in 
principle, at least—robust protection for religious conscience and for 
churches’ self-governance. The Court seemed committed to the idea 
that government and religion should influence each other as little 
as possible. 
But already the cracks were appearing, and they grew quickly. 
Beginning in the early 1980s, the Court stepped back from its broad 
separationist commitments on several controversial fronts: 
 Increased aid to religious organizations. In 1973’s 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, the Court 
determined that if aid to a religious organization could be 
put to religious purposes, it was impermissible.23 But it 
quickly became clear that the Court would not enforce its 
rule. Within ten years, the Court had approved a direct cash 
subsidy to religious schools,24 narrowed its standing doctrine 
to prevent some government support for religious 
institutions from ever being challenged in court,25 and 
upheld tax deductions for religious school tuition—despite 
having struck down tax credits for religious school tuition in 
Nyquist.26 In 1995 the Court held that government subsidies 
to religious groups are actually constitutionally mandatory in 
some circumstances,27 and in 2002 it all but overturned 
 
 21. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772–73 
(1973) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13)). 
 22. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13). 
 23. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756; see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
 24. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). 
 25. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
 26. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1983); Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756. 
 27. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
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Nyquist, allowing states to subsidize religious school tuition 
through religion-neutral voucher programs.28 
 The erosion of the Lemon test. Though Lemon was a 
religious school subsidy case, it presented itself as a general 
statement of the requirements of the Establishment Clause.29 
Nevertheless, the Court never treated it as such, and its 
importance has declined as the Court has repeatedly chosen 
not to apply it, choosing instead to decide cases based on 
“history and tradition,”30 the Free Speech Clause,31 or Justice 
O’Connor’s endorsement test.32 Eventually Lemon’s 
influence grew so small that one majority opinion attempted 
to jettison its crucial injunction against church-state 
entanglements,33 and another dismissed its three-prong test 
as “no more than helpful signposts.”34 
 The collapse of the compelling interest test. Separationism in 
the Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence met a similar fate, as 
the Court never applied Sherbert’s compelling interest test as 
broadly as it seemed to demand. The Court continued to use 
it to require states to give employment compensation to 
people who rejected work for religious reasons,35 but with 
the exception of Yoder, the Court never used the compelling 
interest test to require religious exemptions in any other 
context.36 In some contexts, the Court concluded that the 
 
 28. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 661–62 (2002) (“[W]e now hold that 
Nyquist does not govern neutral educational assistance programs that, like the program here, 
offer aid directly to a broad class of individual recipients defined without regard to religion.”). 
 29. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 602 (1971). 
 30. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983). 
 31. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981). 
 32. The endorsement test first appeared in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). It was later cited in a number of majority or plurality opinions, for 
example Board of Education v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), and Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 33. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (noting that “[n]ot all entanglements, 
of course, have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion”). But see Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 
314 (after Agostini, still referring to Lemon as a “three factor” test). 
 34. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 
734, 741 (1973)). 
 35. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 
146 (1987). 
 36. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–83 (claiming 
that “[w]e have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test 
except the denial of unemployment compensation” and supporting this claim with a list of the 
Court’s Free Exercise precedents). Michael McConnell sharply (and accurately) criticizes 
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burden on religious exercise was justified by a compelling 
state interest,37 while in others it concluded that Sherbert and 
Yoder did not apply.38 Eventually the Court concluded that 
Sherbert only applied to laws that are not “neutral and 
generally applicable,”39 leaving most burdens on religious 
exercise subject to no more than rational basis review. 
This decline of separationism has been explained in a number of 
ways. To some, it is the work of the religious right:40 the school 
prayer decisions have always been unpopular with voters,41 so the 
Republican Party took advantage of their unpopularity42 and 
appointed judges who would work to overturn those decisions. To 
others, it is a reflection of problems inherent in separationism itself, 
the two most common complaints being that the Court’s 
 
Smith’s use of precedent, but the examples he uses to counter the Court’s claim fall into three 
categories: unemployment cases like Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), Hobbie, 480 U.S. 
136, and Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989); cases in 
which the Free Exercise claim failed, like Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of 
California, 493 U.S. 378 (1990), and Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 
U.S. 680 (1989); and finally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the only non-
unemployment case in which a claim under Sherbert’s compelling interest test persuaded the 
Court. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1990). 
 37. The Court’s compelling interests included the following: Gillette v. United States, 
401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (“interest in procuring . . . manpower” for the military); United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1982) (interest in administering Social Security); 
Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699–700 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 260) (interest in “a sound 
tax system”). 
 38. The Court concluded that the compelling interest test should not apply to the 
following: Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (military dress regulations); 
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 711–12 (1986) (mandatory issuance of social security numbers); 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439, 441–42 (1988) (the 
government’s decision concerning where to build roads and harvest timber on public land). 
 39. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 
(1993); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
 40. See, e.g., DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 255–82 
(2011) (documenting the rise and effects of the conservative “moral majority”); Lupu, supra 
note 8, at 237 (associating the decline of separationism with “the Reagan-Bush years” and the 
conservative “program of putting an end to ‘judicial activism’”) (quoting William Wayne 
Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–6 (1992)). 
 41. David W. Moore, Public Favors Voluntary Prayer for Public Schools, GALLUP (Aug. 
26, 2005), http://www.gallup.com/poll/18136/public-favors-voluntary-prayer-public-
schools.aspx. 
 42. Every Republican platform since 1972 has included support for prayer in schools. 
The complete text of Republican Party platforms since 1856 is available on the website of The 
American Presidency Project at the University of California (Santa Barbara), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php. 
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separationism was based on incorrect historical claims,43 and that 
separationism is incoherent and incapable of leading to a workable 
religion jurisprudence.44 And finally, some scholars see the Court 
abandoning separationism for an ideal of religious neutrality—an 
ideal more consistent with contemporary constitutional law’s 
dominant focus on equality.45 
But whatever the cause, the conventional narrative of scholars 
and commentators is that separationism has declined, that it is 
suffering a “lingering death,”46 that the “wall of separation” is 
crumbling, and so on. And as the foregoing narrative makes clear, 
there are, unquestionably, reasons for this conventional wisdom. 
There can be no question that the Court restricted interactions 
between religion and government more in 1975 than it does today, 
just as there can be no question that the Court’s use of the word 
“separation” and of Jefferson’s “wall” metaphor have declined in 
recent decades.47 
But a few scholars have noticed problems with the conventional 
narrative. Douglas Laycock has argued that the Court’s relaxed 
Establishment Clause doctrine is consistent with separationism 
properly understood, while Ira Lupu, who once wrote of 
separationism’s “lingering death,” has since acknowledged that 
separationism shows signs of lingering life.48 
As these scholars have observed, there remain aspects of the 
Court’s religion jurisprudence that do not fit comfortably into the 
conventional story. The conventional story has difficulty explaining 
why, even in separationism’s heyday, the Court overruled as many 
Establishment Clause challenges as it sustained—except perhaps to 
say that the Court was never completely committed to the wall even 
while it was building it.49 The story has more difficulty explaining 
 
 43. SEHAT, supra note 40, at 235; Steven K. Green, A “Spacious Conception”: 
Separationism as an Idea, 85 OR. L. REV. 443, 450 (2006). 
 44. See, e.g., EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 23. 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 24–25; Green, supra note 5, at 1111–12 (“Neutrality has emerged 
victorious from the doctrinal fray while separationism, which has been on the ropes for two 
decades, is apparently down for the count.”). 
 46. Lupu, supra note 8, at 230. 
 47. The last Supreme Court opinion that approvingly cited the “wall” metaphor was 
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708–09 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 48. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of Worship: 
A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (2002). 
 49. SEHAT, supra note 40. 
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why certain aspects of separationism have survived while others have 
not. School prayer is still unconstitutional after half a century of 
widespread public opposition to the school prayer cases.50 It is still 
unconstitutional for courts to question the reasonableness of a 
person’s religious beliefs even though courts may ask whether a 
person’s other beliefs are reasonable.51 And still, three decades after 
separationism supposedly started dying, churches have a degree of 
constitutionally protected autonomy that non-religious organizations 
lack—autonomy recently affirmed by all nine Justices 
in Hosanna-Tabor. 
B. Problems with the Narrative: Separationism in Hosanna-Tabor 
1. A conflict between separationism and neutrality 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the parties tested the conventional wisdom 
that separationism has been replaced by neutrality, and separationism 
proved quite loudly that it was not dead yet. 
The case was a lawsuit brought by a teacher against her church 
school employer, alleging that she had been fired in violation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. The school responded that she was 
an ordained minister and that her suit was barred by the ministerial 
exception, a doctrine developed by the circuit courts that prevented 
the application of anti-discrimination laws to churches’ choice of 
ministers.52 This defense was rejected by the Sixth Circuit, which 
 
 50. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 
(1963); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 
290 (2000). A Gallop poll in 2005 found that “76% of Americans favor[ed] a constitutional 
amendment . . . allow[ing] voluntary prayer in public schools.” Moore, supra note 41; see also 
Michael Lipka, South Carolina Valedictorian Reignites Debate on Prayer in School, PEW RES. 
CENTER (June 13, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/13/south-
carolina-valedictorian-reignites-debate-on-prayer-in-school/ (“A 2012 Pew Research Center 
poll found that 65% of Americans believe liberals have gone too far trying to keep religion out 
of schools and government. A smaller, but significant share (48%) think conservative Christians 
have gone too far to try to impose religious values on the country.”). 
 51. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
 52. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th 
Cir. 1985); Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 
1994); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Combs v. Cent. Tex. 
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); Starkman 
v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 
F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); 
Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004); Elvig v. 
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determined that, despite her title, she was not a minister for the 
purposes of the exception.53 
It was after the Supreme Court granted certiorari that the case 
became a stark conflict between separationism and neutrality. 
Surprisingly, the government’s brief focused not on defending the 
Sixth Circuit’s narrow definition of “minister,” but rather on 
attacking the ministerial exception itself.54 Less surprisingly, its 
arguments against the ministerial exception were all classic neutrality 
arguments, all similar to arguments that had persuaded the Court to 
abandon separationist doctrines in earlier cases. 
The guiding principle of the government’s theory of the case was 
that religious people and organizations should be treated the same as 
similarly situated non-religious people and organizations. Therefore, 
churches are simply expressive associations, and in principle their 
right to choose their ministers is no different from a union’s right to 
choose its leadership.55 “[A] secular private school would have no 
expressive-association right to discharge a teacher in retaliation for 
her assertion of rights under the antidiscrimination statutes,”56 the 
government argued, so why should a religious private school be 
treated differently? 
Certainly not because of any Free Exercise right. Under 
Employment Division v. Smith, neutral and generally applicable laws 
may constitutionally interfere with religious practices so long as they 
pass the rational basis test, and the employment discrimination laws 
at issue in Hosanna-Tabor are neutral and generally applicable.57 The 
church’s only Free Exercise rights at stake were what Smith called 
“hybrid” rights58 that “merged” into its freedom of association 
 
Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004); Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual 
Conference of United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Petruska v. Gannon 
Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010); Cannata v. Catholic 
Diocese, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 53. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th 
Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 54. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 28–32, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553) 2011 WL 3319555. 
 55. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–28, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(No. 10-553). 
 56. Brief for Cheryl Perich at 18, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553) 
2011 WL 3380507. 
 57. Brief for Federal Respondent, supra note 54, at 21–29. 
 58. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990). 
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right.59 These rights ensured that churches and other expressive 
associations would be able to choose leaders who espoused their 
expressive message, but the rights would not permit discrimination 
unrelated to an association’s message.60 The rights certainly would 
not treat the choice of ministers as a matter from which the 
government must remain scrupulously separate. 
The government acknowledged that the Establishment Clause 
prohibits government from “tak[ing] sides in a religious dispute”61—
a principle that the Court had used in earlier cases to protect 
churches’ autonomy from government interference.62 But the 
government distinguished this principle by appealing again to 
neutrality. Citing the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf, 
the government argued that the employment discrimination claims 
against churches could be resolved based on “neutral principles of 
law” and that the Establishment Clause therefore permitted them to 
go forward.63 On every point, the respondents made the sort of 
neutrality-based arguments that had persuaded the Court to narrow 
its separationist doctrines in the past. 
And on every point, the neutrality-based arguments failed 
spectacularly. At oral argument, when the government attempted to 
explain how churches’ right to choose their ministers was essentially 
the same right as labor unions’ right to choose their leaders, Justice 
Scalia exploded: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: That’s extraordinary. 
MS. KRUGER: I — 
JUSTICE SCALIA: That is extraordinary. 
MS. KRUGER: Well, I — 
. . . 
 
 59. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 38. 
 60. Brief for Cheryl Perich, supra note 56, at 22. 
 61. Id. at 20. 
 62. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Kreshik v. Saint 
Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth 
Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese 
for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
 63. Cf. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (ruling that “the First Amendment 
prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine 
and practice.”). 
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JUSTICE SCALIA: There’s nothing in the Constitution that 
explicitly prohibits the government from mucking around in 
a labor organization. . . . [B]ut there, black on white in the 
text of the Constitution are special protections for religion. 
And you say that makes no difference?64 
Justice Scalia was not the only Justice to be bothered by the 
argument. Justice Kagan called it “amazing” that the government 
would take the position it did,65 and the Court’s unanimous opinion 
declared, “We cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion 
Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom 
to select its own ministers.”66 
The Court rejected the government’s neutrality-based 
interpretations of both Religion Clauses, concluding that letting the 
suit go forward would violate each Religion Clause independently. 
When the government tried to defend its interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause using Smith, its position was rejected by Justice 
Scalia, who wrote Smith: “Smith didn’t involve employment by a 
church. It had nothing to do with who —  who the church could 
employ. I don’t — I don’t see how that has any relevance to this.”67 
And the Court’s opinion again agreed with him: “Smith involved 
government regulation of only outward physical acts. The present 
case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal 
church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church 
itself.”68 This distinction may be untenable—the Native American 
Church’s sacramental use of peyote at issue in Smith was 
unquestionably an “internal church decision that affect[ed] the faith 
and mission of the church itself”—but whether it is coherent or not, 
the outward/inward distinction is a classic separationist move, 
distinguishing between a sphere in which government can act freely 
and a religious sphere with which the government may not interfere. 
On the other hand, the government’s interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause was simply ignored. The Court’s opinion cited 
the church autonomy cases that had forbidden the government to 
take sides in religious disputes, concluding that these cases supported 
 
 64. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 28–29. 
 65. Id. at 37. 
 66. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
706 (2012). 
 67. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 38. 
 68. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706–07. 
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a ministerial exception.69 It did not mention Jones v. Wolf, the 
neutrality-centered case that the government had relied on that 
allowed courts to resolve internal church disputes so long as they 
could do so using “neutral principles of law.”70 At every point, the 
government’s arguments for neutrality were rejected in favor 
of separationism. 
2. A thoroughly separationist opinion 
The Hosanna-Tabor Court reached strikingly separationist 
conclusions, but perhaps more striking was the resemblance between 
its reasoning and the reasoning of famous separationist precedents. 
This similarity is most obviously visible in the Court’s use of 
religion clause history, which shares the following features with the 
extensive historical accounts in Everson and Engel: 
 A description of some institutional entanglement between 
church and state, presumed to be oppressive, that was 
common in Europe during or before the colonial period.71 
 The claim that this oppressive entanglement was so 
strongly opposed by the American colonists that it was 
among the reasons why they left Europe for the 
New World.72 
 An extensive focus on James Madison’s views of church-
state relations.73 
 The assumption that because Madison and some of his 
contemporaries opposed a particular church-state 
entanglement, that entanglement is banned by the 
religion clauses.74 
 
 69. Id. at 704–06. (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox 
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952) and Serbian E. Orthodox Dioceses for U.S. & Can. v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)). 
 70. 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979). 
 71. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702; see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 10–
11 (1947); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962). 
 72. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702–03; see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 10; Engel, 370 
U.S. at 427. 
 73. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703–04; Everson, 330 U.S. at 12; Engel, 370 U.S. 
at 428. 
 74. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703 (quoting Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. 
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1446 (2011) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968)) 
(calling Madison “the leading architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment”). 
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Hosanna-Tabor’s separationist historical narrative does differ 
somewhat from its predecessors. It examines several states rather 
than focusing exclusively on Virginia,75 it relies less on the writings of 
Thomas Jefferson, and it uses post-ratification history as evidence of 
the meaning of the Amendment, an approach usually associated with 
the Court’s less separationist decisions like Marsh v. Chambers.76 But 
the basic thrust of the historical argument remains the same: a 
church-state entanglement should be invalidated because it 
resembles an English practice that Madison and other early 
Americans abhorred. 
Ultimately, the Court responded to the government’s simple 
theory of the case—namely, that churches should be treated the 
same as secular expressive associations—with a simple theory of its 
own, which can be summarized in a very simple, very 
separationist syllogism: 
Major premise: The religion clauses prohibit governments 
from interfering in church affairs by appointing ministers.77 
Minor premise: Holding a church liable for dismissing a 
minister would effectively appoint a minister.78 
Conclusion: The Religion Clauses prohibit the government 
from holding a church liable for dismissing a minister, even if 
the dismissal violates anti-discrimination laws. 
The Court’s whole argument was an attempt to define a proper 
sphere for the church and to keep the state separate from it. At no 
point did the Court attempt to justify its reasoning in terms of 
neutrality or equality; in fact, the two words barely appear in the 
opinion79—even though the case concerned anti-discrimination laws, 
a context where one would expect principles of equality to 
be paramount. 
In summary, the government’s decision to attack the ministerial 
exception with neutrality arguments made Hosanna-Tabor an almost 
 
 75. Id. at 702–03. 
 76. Id. at 703–04; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788–90 (1983). 
 77. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct.at 703. 
 78. Id. at 709 (“Perich continues to seek frontpay in lieu of reinstatement, backpay, 
compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. An award of such relief would 
operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no 
less prohibited by the First Amendment than an order overturning the termination.”). 
 79. Id. at 706–07. 
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perfect test case for the conventional wisdom that separationism has 
been replaced by neutrality. And yet the Court forcefully rejected 
every neutrality argument the government made and chose instead 
to reach a thoroughly separationist conclusion on thoroughly 
separationist grounds, making no effort whatsoever to justify its 
decision in terms of neutrality. It is just one case, but Hosanna-Tabor 
is nevertheless compelling evidence that the Court remains 
committed to some form of separationism. 
If the Court does remain committed to separationism, however, 
it raises a few questions. Why has separationism’s continued vitality 
gone generally (though not universally) unappreciated? And how is it 
that the Court can have remained separationist despite having 
substantially changed its religion jurisprudence and largely 
abandoned the word “separation”? 
C. Problems with the Narrative: The Difficulty of 
Defining Separationism 
1. Separationism’s many meanings 
The chief reason that scholars’ understanding of the rise and fall 
of separationism is vague and imprecise is that scholars’ 
understanding of separationism itself has been mostly vague and 
imprecise. Douglas Laycock acknowledged this problem recently, 
declaring that “the phrase [‘separation of church and state’] has no 
agreed core of meaning that will enable anyone to communicate. . . . 
[W]e now know that from the phrase alone, without an analysis of 
context, we have no idea what people mean by it.”80 
If Laycock means that separationism “has no agreed core of 
meaning” among today’s courts and legal scholars, I think he 
exaggerates slightly.81 Clearly, separation of church and state means 
that the government may not establish an official church,82 and 
further, nearly everyone associates separationism with a handful of 
 
 80. Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1667, 
1700–01 (2003). 
 81. If, on the other hand, he means that there is no common meaning of separationism 
that has been shared across the several centuries in which the term has been used, then he may 
not be exaggerating at all. 
 82. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 23 (“The wall metaphor . . . captures a basic 
institutional difference between the United States and countries such as Great Britain and Iran 
that recognize an official national church or faith.”). 
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important Supreme Court precedents: Engel v. Vitale,83 Abington 
School District v. Schempp,84 and so forth. But this core is small, and 
its hazy penumbras are vast. 
This haziness clears when one examines a list of religion clause 
controversies and asks which position on each controversy is 
separationist. Are tax exemptions for churches consistent with 
separationism? Scholars disagree.85 Does separationism favor or 
oppose religious exemptions from neutral laws? Again, scholars 
disagree.86 Many scholars argue that if a state subsidizes private 
school education through tuition vouchers, separationism permits it 
to subsidize only non-religious schools,87 but according to one 
eminent scholar, separationism actually requires states to subsidize 
religious schools on equal terms with non-religious ones.88 Scholars 
do not even agree on whether separationism is predominantly a 
principle of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, or whether it 
matters in Free Exercise cases as well.89 
Further, when explaining what constitutional purpose 
separationism is supposed to serve, scholars give radically different 
 
 83. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 84. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 85. Compare Lupu, supra note 8, at 235 (claiming that Walz is consistent with 
separationism), with SEHAT, supra note 40, at 259–60 (arguing that Walz is inconsistent 
with separationism). 
 86. Compare Lupu, supra note 8, at 236–37 (arguing that Free Exercise exemptions are 
consistent with separationism), with Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 688–89 (1980). 
 87. E.g., Marshall, supra note 6, at 484 (giving the reasons of “religious integrity, 
church-state entanglement, government evaluation of religion, and sectarian divisiveness” as 
reasons against vouchers); Melissa Rogers, Traditions of Church-State Separation: Some Ways 
They Have Protected Religion and Advanced Religious Freedom and How They Are Threatened 
Today, 18 J.L. & POL. 277, 316 (2002) (“[W]hile careful governmental regulation and 
oversight is necessary and appropriate in these contexts, it will seriously degrade 
religion’s independence.”). 
 88. Laycock, supra note 7, at 68–73 (explaining Laycock’s theory of “substantive 
neutrality,” which he sees as consistent with separationism and which requires religious entities 
to be subsidized on equal terms with non-religious ones). 
 89. Many scholars speak of separationism only in the Establishment Clause context. See, 
e.g., Brett G. Scharffs, Protecting Religious Freedom: Two Counterintuitive Dialectics in U.S. 
Free Exercise Jurisprudence, in FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER BILLS OF RIGHTS 285, 304–05 
(Paul Babie & Neville Rochow, eds., 2012) (discussing separationism in the Establishment 
Clause context but not the Free Exercise context). Others see separationism as a general 
statement of proper church-state relations, one that supports particular Free Exercise outcomes 
as well. See, e.g., EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 22–50 (explaining separationism’s 
implications, including for Free Exercise issues like religious exemptions). 
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answers: religious liberty,90 equality,91 preserving “the hegemony of 
secular ideology in the public square,”92 or some combination of 
these. William Marshall lists no fewer than four values that 
separationism serves.93 John Witte lists five.94 
2. Separationism’s shared core of meaning 
Given all of this confusion, it is tempting to dismiss 
separationism as a meaningless concept and stop using the term 
entirely. But this temptation should be resisted. It is clear that the 
phrase “separation of church and state” does not communicate a 
single, complete, coherent theory of the Religion Clauses, but it 
does make several implicit claims about the proper relationship 
between religion and government—claims that, although 
increasingly controversial, are broadly shared by authors who 
consider themselves separationist. 
At its heart, “separation of church and state” is a spatial 
metaphor. The core meaning of the verb “to separate” is to put 
distance between two objects, “to keep apart or divide, as by an 
intervening barrier or space.”95 Applying a physical, spatial 
relationship like separation to abstract concepts like “church” and 
“state” entails making assumptions about how the physical concept 
maps onto the abstract domain in question, and these assumptions 
are the core claims shared by practically all separationist theories. 
What are these assumptions? Beginning with the obvious, 
separationist theories assume that there is something called “church” 
and something called “state.” Further, they assume that “church” 
and “state” are things that can in principle be recognized and 
 
 90. Green, supra note 5, at 1121 (arguing that the recent reinterpretation of 
separationism to serve neutrality is contrary to the historical meaning of the Religion Clauses). 
 91. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 229 (“With . . . the main lines of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence in the latter half of the twentieth century . . . I shall suggest that a good 
guide is the idea of equality.”); see also id. at 11 (“[T]here was a brief era when the separation 
idea acquired a momentum of its own and things became unbalanced.”); id. at 224–72 
(explaining the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence in terms of equality, beginning 
with the school prayer cases). 
 92. Lupu, supra note 8, at 249. 
 93. Marshall, supra note 6, at 484–90. 
 94. John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1869, 
1889–91 (2003). 
 95. Separate Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
separate?s=t (last visited Aug. 2, 2013). 
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distinguished from each other, even if the task may be difficult in 
practice. Though these insights may seem obvious, they actually 
constitute separationism’s first non-trivial claim. The idea that 
religious ideas, practices, and institutions can be distinguished from 
non-religious ones has increasingly come under attack in both social 
scientific and legal literatures.96 Separationists might respond to this 
critique in a variety of ways, but if they wish to separate church and 
state, they cannot abandon the idea that there is in fact a church. 
A second non-trivial claim implied by the separation metaphor is 
that the church not only can be distinguished from the rest of 
society, but that it ought to be. In other words, if there are other 
entities in society that do not need to be separated from the state, 
the church should be treated differently from them. This claim has 
also come increasingly under attack in recent years, as scholars have 
disputed whether religion merits any sort of “special treatment.”97 
To any theory plausibly claiming to be separationist, the answer must 
be “yes.” 
Moving our focus from the words “church” and “state” to the 
word “separation” yields a third important separationist claim. As 
pointed out above, separation is a relationship between two objects 
in space, and it is always reciprocal: it is impossible for an object to 
be separate from something that is not separate from it. In other 
words, to separate X from Y is always to separate Y from X. This 
suggests that separationist theories are similarly reciprocal, 
advocating both that the state should be protected from church 
interference and that the church should be protected from state 
interference.98 Unlike separationism’s first two claims, this claim has 
always been controversial, with advocates of greater religious 
influence on government complaining (for example) of a “naked 
 
 96. WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
138–39 (2005) (arguing that it is impossible for courts to define “religion” fairly and 
consistently and that the effort to do so will inevitably disadvantage people with nontraditional 
or idiosyncratic religious beliefs); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It 
Matter What Religion Is?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 807 (2009) (using the difficulty of 
defining religion as an argument for abandoning separationism). 
 97. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Is it Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 571, 572 (2006). 
 98. Cf. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (“[T]he 
First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to 
achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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public square.”99 Recently, this claim has found new attackers: critics 
of religion who want a thoroughly secular state to regulate religious 
belief and practice.100 
To summarize, the separationist metaphor expresses three 
popular but by no means universally accepted claims: 
1. First, that there is something called “church” and 
something called “state,” and that church and state can be 
distinguished from each other and from the rest of society. 
2. Second, that the church ought to be treated differently 
from other entities that do not need to be separated from 
the state. 
3. Third, that church and state should each be protected 
from the other, rather than only one of them 
being protected. 
These three claims are the core of separationism’s meaning and 
are shared by all understandings of separationism of which I am 
aware. As such, these claims provide a convenient measuring stick for 
determining whether a scholar’s theory or a justice’s opinion is 
separationist. If all three of these claims play an important role in an 
argument, then the argument is structurally separationist, even if, for 
whatever reason, the argument’s author chooses to avoid the 
word “separation.” 
3. The mischief of suppressed assumptions 
Identifying these core separationist claims is valuable for another 
reason: it calls attention to the key point on which separationist 
theories differ, and thus explains both why there has been such 
rampant confusion regarding separationism and why the confusion 
has sometimes gone unnoticed. This key point of difference is the 
definition and nature of the church. 
1. If, following the first core claim, the church exists and can 
be distinguished from the state and the rest of society, what is 
the church and how do we distinguish it? 
 
 99. NEUHAUS, supra note 3. 
 100. See, e.g., SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE 
OF REASON (2004).  
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2. If, following the second and third core claims, the church 
should be treated differently from other entities in society, 
what is it about the church that merits this special treatment? 
Justice Frankfurter alluded to these questions in his McCollum 
concurrence: “[A]greement, in the abstract, that the First 
Amendment was designed to erect a wall of separation between 
church and State, does not preclude a clash of views as to what the 
wall separates.”101 Yet the mischief that unstated assumptions about 
the “church” have wrought upon separationist reasoning has not 
generally been appreciated. There has been some debate between 
those who understand “church” to mean actual churches102 and 
those who think separationism should separate government from 
religion more broadly.103 But this church-as-institutions versus 
church-as-religion-generally debate radically understates the 
difficulty. “Religion” is a famously amorphous concept, one some 
scholars have advocated abandoning entirely,104 and it is unlikely that 
the various advocates of separating government from religion all 
have the same idea of “religion” in mind. 
To give one of many possible examples, from the nineteenth 
century through the 1960s, many Protestant separationists 
supported prayer and Bible study in public schools on the grounds 
that such practices were not actually religious.105 To them, “religion” 
was synonymous with sectarianism—that is, it consisted primarily of 
the beliefs and practices that divide denominations from each 
other.106 Because everyone was assumed to accept prayer and Bible 
study, these practices were considered part of “general Christianity” 
or the “Judeo-Christian tradition” rather than part of religion, and 
they were therefore permitted in schools as a form of moral 
education. Today’s courts and scholars are probably unanimous that 
 
 101. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 213 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 102. See, e.g., Derek H. Davis, Editorial, Separation, Integration, and Accommodation: 
Religion and State in America in a Nutshell, 43 J. CHURCH & ST. 5, 9–10 (2001). 
 103. See, e.g., McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212 (“The First Amendment rests upon the 
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is 
left free from the other within its respective sphere.”)(emphasis added)). 
 104. E.g. SULLIVAN, supra note 96, at 138–39. 
 105. STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
CLASH THAT SHAPED MODERN CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE (2012). 
 106. This definition was not neutral, of course—that it allowed Protestants but not 
Catholics to use public schools for religious education was one of its chief attractions. 
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prayer and Bible study are religious practices, but that does not mean 
that courts and scholars have any shared understanding of why 
prayer and Bible study are religious, or how to distinguish between 
religious and non-religious beliefs, symbols, practices, and so forth. 
Drawing such a distinction is often extremely difficult, and cases that 
turn on the distinction between religion and non-religion still reach 
the Court regularly.107 
As a result of this confusion, two people might agree that church 
and state ought to be separated, and agree that by “church” they 
mean all of religion, and yet lack a common understanding of 
“religion” and disagree on the correct outcome of every religion 
clause controversy in the last seventy years—possibly without even 
noticing their disagreement. On the other hand, they might disagree 
in principle about separationism and yet interpret the religion clauses 
in very similar ways, possibly without noticing their agreement. And 
as I will argue below, the conventional story of separationism’s 
decline makes both of these mistakes. 
As I will argue in Parts III through V, the conventional story 
assumes too much similarity between the Court’s early separationism 
and its strict separationism of the 1970s, possibly because the Court 
in both eras used separationist rhetoric in its opinions. Further, it 
fails to acknowledge the similarities between the Court’s early 
separationism and its current approach to the Religion Clauses, 
possibly because the Court no longer uses separationist rhetoric as 
often as it once did. Nevertheless, that the Court avoids separationist 
rhetoric does not mean that it eschews separationist reasoning. Part 
III makes this case with respect to the Court’s Free Exercise 
jurisprudence, and Parts IV and V make the same case in the more 
complicated context of the Establishment Clause. 
 
 107. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (challenging a nativity scene in a 
city holiday display); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989) (deciding the constitutionality of a crèche in county courthouse); Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (challenging school district policy requiring 
recitation of Pledge of Allegiance); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (challenging 
monument inscribed with Ten Commandments on state capitol grounds); McCreary Cnty. v. 
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (deciding constitutionality of Ten Commandments posted in a 
county courthouse). 
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III. THE NEW FREE EXERCISE SEPARATIONISM: PROTECTING 
RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
According to the conventional narrative, Free Exercise 
separationism aimed to leave every aspect of Americans’ religious 
lives as free as possible from government influence, to 
“minimiz[e] . . . the government’s influence over personal choices 
concerning religious beliefs and practices.”108 This principle guided 
the Court’s most important separationist Free Exercise decisions, 
Sherbert and Yoder, which established that government may not 
burden religious practices unless doing so is the only way to achieve 
a compelling state interest.109 Protecting religious practice with the 
compelling interest test is often presented as an inevitable 
implication of the separationist idea,110 a consummation towards 
which the Court’s early separationist decisions were clearly working. 
I disagree. The compelling interest test of Sherbert and Yoder was 
indeed a flowering of separationist ideas planted in the Court’s 
earlier decisions, but it was not the only flower that might have 
grown from those seeds. In reasoning from the idea of separation to 
the compelling interest test as Yoder applied it, the Court had to 
make a crucial and debatable assumption: that the “church” from 
which the “state” should be separated includes all religious practices 
rather than only some religious practices, or only religious 
institutions, or only religious belief. 
This Part argues that the Court’s early decisions did not make 
this key assumption, and instead focused its separationism specifically 
on religious belief and on the practices and institutions through 
which individuals develop their religious beliefs. This Part then 
describes the problems that arose from the Court’s broad 
understanding of the “church” in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, this 
Part argues that the Court’s decisions in Smith and Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, which are generally 
understood as abandoning Free Exercise separationism for neutrality, 
actually had a more subtle effect of dividing Free Exercise 
 
 108. Laycock, supra note 7, at 69 (emphasis added) (Esbeck, supra note 4, at 25. 
 109. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“[O]nly those interests of the 
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free 
exercise of religion.”). 
 110. E.g., Laycock, supra note 7, at 69 (“Minimizing government influence is consistent 
with the central meaning of separation—it maximally separates government power and 
influence from religious belief and practice.”).  
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jurisprudence into two separate doctrinal realms: one governed by 
separationism, concerning itself with religious belief and the 
institutions and practices that shape belief; and the other governed 
by neutrality and protecting other aspects of religion from 
government discrimination. 
A. From Cantwell to Sherbert: The Narrow Church of Belief 
Between 1937 and 1960, the Court laid the foundations of 
modern Free Exercise jurisprudence, deciding over two dozen claims 
by religious claimants under the Free Exercise and Free Speech 
Clauses.111 Separationism was not the only idea on the Court’s mind 
in these cases, but the justices were nevertheless functionally 
separationist, delineating a religious sphere within which religion 
could exist free of government interference. And the principle that 
guided this delineation was that of individuals’ freedom of religious 
belief (discussed in III.A.1 below). 
But, the Court recognized that, for individuals’ choice of 
religious beliefs to be truly free, they must also be free to hear new 
ideas, to speak their minds (III.A.2), and to associate with like-
minded people (III.A.3). These insights have long been the core of 
First Amendment jurisprudence generally, and their application to 
Religion Clause controversies has been particularly strict, often 
providing greater protection for the formation and spread of 
religious beliefs than for non-religious ideas. 
However, the freedom to form one’s religious beliefs does not 
depend on the freedom to act on those beliefs. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the Court’s separationism in this era provided little 
protection for what are now often called claims of religious 
conscience—that is, claims that a person should not have to obey a 
particular law because doing so would be contrary to her religious 
beliefs. The Court’s early unwillingness to validate such claims is 
discussed in Subsection III.A.4. 
1. Protecting belief itself 
Few Supreme Court cases in any era have dealt with actual 
prohibitions on belief, likely because of the difficulty of prohibiting 
 
 111. For a list, see Appendix Three of JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION 
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 305 (3d ed. 2011) (listing all “Supreme 
Court decisions relating to religious liberty” up to 2010). 
HURST.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
26 
belief itself rather than expressions of it. But the Supreme Court’s 
early separationism made it clear that the freedom to choose one’s 
religious beliefs is absolute—even more protected than the freedom 
to choose one’s beliefs in other contexts. 
This preferential treatment appears in the Court’s 1944 decision 
United States v. Ballard, in which the leaders of a small religious 
movement were indicted for fraud on the theory that they had 
obtained money from their followers by making dishonest claims to 
divine visitations and miraculous healing powers.112 The Court 
permitted the indictment, but—contrary to standard practice in 
fraud cases—forbade juries from passing judgment on whether the 
defendants’ claims were true or false: 
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, 
is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right to maintain 
theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank 
heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials are 
foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot 
prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious 
doctrines or beliefs.113 
In addition to protecting believers from inquiries into the 
truthfulness or falsity of their religious beliefs, the Court later 
protected believers from having to deny their religious belief by 
making oaths contrary to it. Because it was difficult to determine 
whether such oaths are constitutionally protected statements of 
belief, rather than actions that could be freely regulated, protection 
on this point was not entirely consistent: in 1945 the Court allowed 
Illinois to deny bar membership to applicants who would not swear 
to serve in the militia during wartime.114 But the very next year, the 
Court struck down the requirement that candidates for naturalized 
citizenship swear to fight for the United States,115 and the Court’s 
approach to oaths contrary to a claimant’s religion has generally 
 
 112. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
 113. Id. at 86 (citations omitted). 
 114. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 570–73 (1945) (“It is impossible for us to conclude 
that the insistence of Illinois that an officer who is charged with the administration of justice 
must take an oath to support the Constitution of Illinois and Illinois’ interpretation of that 
oath to require a willingness to perform military service violates the principles of religious 
freedom which the Fourteenth Amendment secures against state action . . . .”). 
 115. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
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followed its famous words in West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are 
any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now 
occur to us.116 
This idea—that government may not establish a religious 
orthodoxy but must rather allow individuals to form their own 
religious opinions—was indeed the “fixed star” of the Court’s 
early separationism. 
2. The right to preach 
Just as democracy depends on free public debate,117 individuals’ 
freedom of religious belief cannot be meaningfully exercised if other 
individuals cannot preach or otherwise spread their own beliefs. This 
freedom to preach and proselytize was the subject of a large majority 
of the Court’s religion decisions in the early separationist era, 
decisions that formed the basis of modern Free Speech law.118 
It is unnecessary to go into detail about these decisions. It 
suffices to say that in order to protect the free development of 
religious belief, the Court established constitutional protections for 
believers to proselytize from door to door,119 solicit funds for 
religious purposes,120 distribute religious literature,121 display 
 
 116. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see also Torcaso v. 
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (striking down Maryland’s requirement that state officers 
declare a belief in God because “neither a State nor the Federal Government can 
constitutionally force a person to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 117. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (3d ed. 2004). 
 118. By my count, the Court decided an astonishing twenty-two cases concerning 
proselytism or other public preaching between 1938 and 1953—about 1.5 cases per year—
from Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), to Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 
395 (1953). 
 119. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 
413 (1943). 
 120. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 121. Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Lovell, 303 U.S. 444. 
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supposedly sacrilegious films,122 and hold religious parades and 
public assemblies.123 
Many of these protections were grounded in the Free Speech 
and Press Clauses, rather than the Free Exercise Clause, but with 
respect to the cases’ religious claimants, the purpose and effect of the 
decisions was clearly separationist. Legislatures could not use 
censorship to protect favored religious beliefs from criticism,124 they 
could not give executive officials discretion that effectively allowed 
them to block the teaching of disfavored religious views,125 and they 
could not tax the delivering of sermons and distribution of religious 
literature except to recoup the public expenses occasioned by the 
religious speech.126 
In the language of Cantwell, the “essential characteristic” of 
these new constitutional rights is “that under their shield many types 
of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and 
unobstructed.”127 Effectively, these decisions made religious speech 
part of the “church” from which government needed to be kept 
scrupulously separate. 
3. Church autonomy 
Finally, the Court’s early decisions concerning separation of 
church and state protected actual churches as well as individuals’ 
beliefs and religious speech. Faced with a New York law that 
transferred authority over New York’s Russian Orthodox 
congregations away from the Patriarch of Moscow, the Court 
determined that to intervene in church affairs in such a manner 
“violate[d] our rule of separation between church and state.”128 
Churches should have “power to decide for themselves, free from 
state interference, matters of church government as well as those of 
faith and doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy . . . must now be 
 
 122. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
 123. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 
(1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
 124. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. 495. 
 125. Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 418 (1943); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308. 
 126. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a tax); Follett v. Town 
of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (invalidating a tax); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 
395 (1953) (permitting license fees that pay for city expenses incurred because of the 
constitutionally protected activity). 
 127. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310. 
 128. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952). 
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said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free 
exercise of religion against state interference.”129 As in United States 
v. Ballard, the Free Exercise Clause gave religious claimants 
preferential treatment over non-religious ones.130 
4. Minimal protection for religious practice 
As the foregoing discussion shows, the Court—by espousing 
doctrines protecting individuals’ rights to believe, preach, and 
assemble, as well as churches’ right to choose their representatives—
marked off a robust church sphere including most of the key 
practices and institutions through which individuals form their 
religious beliefs.131 But outside this sphere, the Court showed little 
interest in accommodating religious practice, acknowledging in 
Cantwell that “the Amendment embraces two concepts, — freedom 
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature 
of things, the second cannot be.”132 
This contrast can be seen most clearly in the flag salute cases, 
Gobitis and Barnette. When the Court understood the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses to be requesting an exception from a law regulating 
conduct, it rejected their claim by a vote of eight to one: 
“Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle 
for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a 
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious 
beliefs.”133 But three years later the Court granted an identical claim 
because it no longer understood the flag salute laws as regulations of 
conduct. Instead, it saw them as an effort to enforce belief in a 
political orthodoxy.134 The Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs did not 
permit them to act contrary to the law, but they could not be 
required to abandon the beliefs themselves. 
 
 129. Id. at 116; see also Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); 
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440 (1969). 
 130. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 131. The most glaring omission—parents’ religious education of their children—had 
already received protection in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925), and would gain further protection still in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205 (1972). 
 132. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303–04. 
 133. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940). 
 134. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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The Court repeated this process in two cases concerning oaths to 
serve in the military. In 1945’s In re Summers, the Court allowed 
Illinois to deny bar membership to those who would not swear to 
join the militia in time of war.135 The Court had already rejected the 
claim that there was a constitutional right not to join the military;136 
why should there then be a constitutional right not to promise to 
join the military?137 
Yet the very next year, the Court concluded that a citizenship 
application should not be denied merely because the applicant was a 
religious pacifist.138 The Court’s decision was statutory rather than 
constitutional, but it still invoked the First Amendment and 
recharacterized oaths promising to serve in the military as a matter of 
belief, not conduct: “Freedom of thought, which includes freedom 
of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men. The test oath is 
abhorrent to our tradition.”139 
These cases demonstrate how sharply the Court distinguished 
between claims to constitutional protection for religious belief and 
claims to protection for religious practice—in effect showing that 
belief was part of the church from which government needed to be 
separated, and that practice was not. 
5. Summary 
At no point in this era did the Court give anything like a 
complete theoretical account of its separationism, with definitions of 
the church and state and a comprehensive statement of why this set 
of religious practices, and no others, should be protected. It also did 
not always take care to show how its decisions fit together; in 
particular, its crucial church autonomy decision in Kedroff rests more 
on the mere words “separation between church and state” than on 
any effort to show how the Free Exercise principles articulated in 
earlier cases applied to churches’ internal governance structures. Nor 
did the Court always understand its decisions in the precise light I 
am presenting them in here. For example, Cantwell presented itself 
as a decision concerning religious conduct rather than (as I have 
 
 135. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 570–72 (1945). 
 136. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 261–65 (1934). 
 137. Summers, 325 U.S. at 572. 
 138. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
 139. Id. at 69 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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argued) a decision about religious speech and therefore more closely 
related to belief than to conduct.140 
Yet in retrospect, the Court’s decisions make its goals very clear. 
Because the Court wanted to protect individuals’ freedom to choose 
their own religious beliefs, it forbade governments from enforcing 
orthodoxies, whether through pledges and oaths or through jury 
determinations that certain religious beliefs are false. Further, 
because individuals are not free to choose religious beliefs they have 
never heard, the Court forbade governments from interfering with 
the teaching of religious beliefs or with churches’ choice of clergy to 
formulate and preach their religious beliefs. On the other hand, the 
Court refused to strike down laws that burdened religious conduct 
unless they interfered with the formulation or expression of belief. At 
every point, the Court’s Free Exercise decisions aimed to separate 
the state from the church, as the Court understood it—that is, to 
separate the state from the set of institutions and practices necessary 
for the free development of individual belief. 
B. Seeger and Yoder: The Impossibly Broad Church 
The narrow church of belief had the advantage of relative 
clarity—institutions and practices necessary for the free development 
of religious belief were protected, and other institutions and 
practices were not—but there were reasons to be unsatisfied with its 
narrow scope. In particular, “general law[s] not aimed at the 
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs”141 often did in fact 
restrict religious beliefs through their disparate impact, burdening 
people who held one set of beliefs much more than people who held 
other beliefs. The Court noticed this problem in 1961’s Braunfeld v. 
Brown, in which Jewish business owners complained that because of 
their Sabbatarian beliefs, Sunday closing laws effectively forced them 
to stay closed for two days per week, possibly destroying their 
businesses’ economic viability.142 
The Court denied the business owners relief, as one would have 
expected from its earlier decisions, but the plurality’s reasoning 
 
 140. I am not alone in this interpretation. Cf. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (claiming that Cantwell was not merely about “religiously 
motivated action” but also about free speech and a free press). 
 141. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940). 
 142. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
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departed from its treatment of religiously motivated conduct in 
Gobitis and Summers. The opinion did apply classic narrow-church 
separationist principles to the case, quoting Jefferson’s “wall of 
separation” letter and appealing to the well-worn distinction 
between belief and conduct, concluding that it would be impossible 
to invalidate every conduct-regulating law “that may in some way 
result in an economic disadvantage to some religious sects and not to 
others because of the special practices of the various religions.”143 But 
the Court innovated by going on to suggest that if the state could 
have achieved its goal of establishing a day of rest without burdening 
conduct “in accord with” or “demanded by” the claimants’ religious 
beliefs, then the burden on their religious practice would have 
been impermissible.144 
Two years later, Braunfeld’s suggestion became Sherbert’s 
compelling interest test, and the Court established that the sphere of 
protected religious practices now included all “conduct prompted by 
religious principles” that did not “pose[] some substantial threat to 
public safety, peace or order.”145 All other religious practices would 
be protected by the compelling interest test, and it seemed that the 
Court was actually willing to take the test seriously. Braunfeld may 
have deferred to the state legislature on the crucial question of 
whether the state’s interest might be achieved by some less 
burdensome means,146 but Sherbert showed no such deference.147 
If Sherbert had been consistently followed, it would have meant a 
massive expansion of the church that separationism was committed 
to protect. The set of practices and institutions necessary to allow for 
the free formation of religious belief is fairly limited—preaching, 
reading, publishing, associating—but the set of actions that might be 
prompted by religious belief can include literally anything: if anyone 
could possibly want to do a thing, someone might want to do it for 
religious reasons. 
 
 143. Id. at 606. 
 144. Id. at 603–04. 
 145. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
 146. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608 (“[I]n [a previous case], we examined several suggested 
alternative means by which it was argued that the State might accomplish its secular goals 
without even remotely or incidentally affecting religious freedom. We found there that a State 
might well find that those alternatives would not accomplish bringing about a general day of 
rest. We need not examine them again here.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
 147. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. 
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The breadth of this nearly infinite religious sphere was only 
expanded by the Court’s general policy of treating all individual 
conscientious belief as religious principle whether it is conventionally 
religious or not. Prior to Sherbert, in United States v. Seeger, the 
Court had been willing to grant conscientious objector status based 
on “sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its 
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God” of conventional 
believers.148 Quoting theologian Paul Tillich, the Court suggested 
that religion is whatever happens to be a person’s “ultimate 
concern, . . . what [she] take[s] seriously without any reservation.”149 
The Court would later allow for similar breadth in applying the 
compelling interest test, holding that a Free Exercise claim could be 
based on a person’s own interpretation of his religious principles 
rather than needing to derive from the consensus of a 
faith community.150 
Further, if this nearly infinite religious sphere were actually 
protected by the full force of the compelling interest test, it would 
have had an immense impact on American law, potentially requiring 
strict scrutiny in a breathtaking number of cases involving 
government actions that, on their face, had nothing to do with 
religion. Faced with the prospect of applying such a demanding test 
to such a broad religious sphere, the Court quickly found ways not 
to apply the Sherbert test as broadly or as strictly as Sherbert had 
suggested.151 But in the end, this was not enough, and the potential 
unruliness of the Sherbert regime led the Court to abandon 
Sherbert’s broad understanding of the religious sphere. 
C. Smith, Lukumi, and Hosanna-Tabor: Back to the Church of Belief 
Smith is sometimes presented as the end of Free Exercise 
separationism, and Lukumi as separationism’s replacement by ideas 
of religious equality and neutrality. The decisions themselves provide 
good reasons for this interpretation: neither majority opinion 
mentions the separation of church and state, both give the idea of 
neutrality a prominent place in their reasoning, and Lukumi is 
 
 148. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). 
 149. Id. at 187. 
 150. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981). 
 151. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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obviously concerned with the problem of religious discrimination.152 
And, of course, the decisions turned separationist Free Exercise 
jurisprudence on its head, radically curtailing the circumstances in 
which the compelling interest test protects religious practice and 
thus leaving religion much more open to government interference 
than the broad-church separationism of the 1970s would 
have permitted. 
There are, however, two problems with concluding on this basis 
that Free Exercise separationism is dead. The first is that separation 
and neutrality are not mutually exclusive concepts; indeed, each 
implies some form of the other.153 In order to be separated from 
religious belief, the state must treat all religious beliefs equally. On 
the other hand, in order to be neutral among religions, the state 
must avoid establishing religious orthodoxies or, in other words, it 
must be separated from matters of religious belief. Further, even if 
the Court’s version of separationism and its version of neutrality are 
ultimately at odds, that does not mean that the two doctrines cannot 
coexist in its jurisprudence. The Court may consider separationism 
appropriate in one context and neutrality appropriate in another, 
which is perhaps the most straightforward way to understand the 
conflict between Smith and Hosanna-Tabor. 
The second problem is that Smith and Lukumi, important as 
they are, are still just two cases, both dealing with criminal 
prohibitions of religious rituals. Though they presented themselves 
in sweeping terms as general statements of the meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause, so too did Sherbert and Yoder, and yet the Smith 
Court easily narrowed those cases almost to nothing when it 
thought their holdings should not be applied in a new context. The 
Court seems to be giving Smith a gentler version of the same 
treatment: when the Court has been asked to apply Smith in new 
contexts—distribution of religious literature154 and churches’ choice 
 
 152. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 153. Cf. Green, supra note 5 (pointing out that neutrality can be a tool of separationism 
or separationism can be a tool of neutrality and arguing that separation, not neutrality, should 
be the dominant idea). 
 154. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
159, 169 (2002) (reversing the Sixth Circuit’s decision to uphold an ordinance because it was 
neutral and generally applicable). 
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of their ministers155—it has refused, finding reasons to grant relief to 
religious claimants that Smith and Lukumi would have denied. 
To state this point more precisely, the protected church sphere 
prior to Smith and Lukumi included religious belief, the expression 
of religious belief, institutions that spread religious belief, and 
actions prompted by religious belief. Smith and Lukumi dealt only 
with the last category—actions prompted by religious belief—leaving 
it an open question whether separationism still protected the other 
aspects of the church. 
The purpose of this Section is to argue that the Court retains 
some commitment to using separationist principles to protect these 
other aspects of the church, demonstrating the Court’s continuing 
commitment to protecting religious belief (III.C.1), religious 
expression (III.C.2), and the autonomy of religious institutions 
(III.C.3). It will also argue that much of the Court’s concern with 
religious discrimination is perfectly consistent with its 
new separationism. 
1. The sharp distinction between belief and conduct 
Smith is often understood as turning Free Exercise jurisprudence 
into a bare equality regime,156 but its actual effect was to reject 
Sherbert’s expansion of the protected church and return to the 
narrow, belief-centric church of its early separationist cases. This can 
be seen most clearly in its adoption of the stark distinction between 
belief and conduct that the Court had originally articulated in its first 
Free Exercise case, Reynolds v. United States,157 and recognized again 
in Cantwell and subsequent cases. Though Smith sharply reduced 
the protection afforded to religious conduct, it affirmed that belief 
remains absolutely protected: 
The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to 
believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, 
the First Amendment obviously excludes all governmental 
regulation of religious beliefs as such. The government may not 
compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the expression of 
religious doctrines it believes to be false, impose special disabilities 
on the basis of religious views or religious status, or lend its power 
 
 155. See discussion of Hosanna-Tabor supra Part II.C. 
 156. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 157. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority 
or dogma.158 
This is an eminently separationist sentiment, entirely consistent 
with the argument from Jefferson’s famous “wall of separation” 
letter that “the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, 
& not opinions.”159 
Smith’s special solicitude for religious beliefs can also be seen in 
its reasoning. Perhaps the chief reason Smith rejects Sherbert’s 
compelling interest test is the fear that believers will be able to 
excuse themselves from whatever laws they wish—and among the 
chief reasons for this fear is the Court’s respect for religious beliefs, 
which prohibits it from interrogating religious beliefs to distinguish 
between important and unimportant practices.160 It is even possible 
to understand Smith’s treatment of Sherbert in this light: to Smith, 
the real problem with denying unemployment compensation to 
Adell Sherbert may not have been that it burdened her religious 
practice, but that it involved a determination that her religious 
beliefs were not “good cause” for rejecting potential employment.161 
Further, this special concern for religious belief can be seen in 
the way Smith and Lukumi conceive of the Free Exercise Clause’s 
protection for religious conduct. According to these cases, laws 
burdening religious conduct are constitutionally suspect only if they 
are not neutral and generally applicable—that is, if their purpose is to 
harm a particular religion or if their burden falls primarily on 
religious claimants.162 According to Smith, 
a State would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it 
sought to ban . . . acts or abstentions only when they are engaged 
in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that 
they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, 
 
 158. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 159. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802) in 57 
LIB. CONGRESS INFO. BULL., June 1998, http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html. 
 160. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–87. 
 161. See id. at 884. 
 162. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–42 
(1993) (neutrality analysis, focused on purpose); id. at 542–46 (general applicability analysis, 
concerned with disparate impact). 
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to ban the casting of “statues that are to be used for worship 
purposes,” or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.163 
Regulations burdening religious conduct are unconstitutional if 
their purpose or predominant effect is government antagonism 
toward particular religious beliefs. This shows a special degree of 
concern for religious beliefs that the Court does not show for other 
types of belief—for example, hate crimes legislation does not become 
constitutionally suspect by targeting the beliefs of racists. 
2. The freedom to preach 
The Court’s continued commitment to the free dissemination of 
religious beliefs is somewhat less obvious, having become obscured 
by its increasing commitment to the free dissemination of all 
beliefs—claims that would once have been brought simultaneously 
under the Free Speech, Free Press, and Free Exercise Clauses are 
now often decided solely on the basis of Free Speech doctrine.164 
Nevertheless, the Court has continued to recognize that 
religious speech merits constitutional protection, possibly more 
protection than at least some other forms of speech. In Smith itself, 
religious speech was recognized as a hybrid right—that is, a form of 
religious conduct that merited extra constitutional protection 
because it implicated another constitutional provision (free speech) 
in addition to the Free Exercise Clause.165 The idea of hybrid rights is 
controversial,166 and its influence on subsequent cases has been 
somewhat limited,167 but it is interesting to note that all three of the 
potential hybrid rights recognized in Smith—religious speech, the 
right of parents to direct their children’s religious education, and the 
right of believers to form religious associations—have to do with the 
dissemination and inculcation of religious beliefs.168 
 
 163. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78. 
 164. E.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (the 
words “free exercise” do not appear in any of the Court’s opinions, and the word “religion” 
appears once). 
 165. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
 166. See Note, The Best of a Bad Lot: Compromise and Hybrid Religious Exemptions, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1494, 1494–96 (2010) (quickly summarizing the debate over hybrid rights). 
 167. Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of the 
Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 573, 
573–74 (2003). 
 168. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. 
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Another indication of the importance of religious speech came in 
2002’s Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village 
of Stratton, in which the Court relied on its long history of 
protecting door-to-door proselytism to invalidate a city ordinance 
because of the burden it placed on advocacy of both religious and 
nonreligious causes. John Witte and Joel Nichols understand this 
decision as affirming Cantwell’s standard of intermediate scrutiny for 
laws burdening religious speech.169 
At the very least, however, the Court has recognized that 
religious speech deserves as much protection as other speech. 
Widmar v. Vincent,170 Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free 
School District,171 and Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of 
Virginia172 are generally known as anti-separationist cases,173 but 
when seen from a Free Exercise perspective, they have an important 
separationist effect: protecting the dissemination of religious beliefs 
by requiring the government to give religious speech access to the 
same public fora available for non-religious speech. 
3. Church autonomy 
The final area in which the Court has proved itself still 
committed to narrow-church separationism is churches’ right to 
govern themselves. As discussed in Section II.C above, the Court 
showed this aspect of its commitment most clearly in Hosanna-
Tabor, where it held that Smith’s rule of neutrality applied only to 
“outward physical acts” and not to “internal church decision[s] that 
affect[] the faith and mission of the church itself.”174 
Hosanna-Tabor’s concern for the formation of religious belief 
was explicit in the Court’s opinion: 
The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of 
their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted 
minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon 
more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes 
with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of 
 
 169. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 111, at 136–37. 
 170. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 171. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).  
 172. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 173. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1. 
 174. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 
(2012) (emphasis added). 
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control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By 
imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free 
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape 
its own faith and mission through its appointments.175 
This concern for the free formation of religious belief, as well as 
the distinction drawn between belief and practice, corresponds 
closely to the Court’s early separationism, which protected actions 
and institutions necessary for the formation of religious belief but 
not those that are merely expressions of religious belief.176 
4. Summary 
Although much about the evolution of the Court’s Free Exercise 
jurisprudence fits the conventional narrative of a shift from 
separationism to equality, the Court continues to provide special 
protections for religious belief and for the institutions and practices 
necessary for the free formation of religious belief. 
This can be seen in Smith’s insistence that regulation of religious 
belief is absolutely prohibited, in Lukumi’s prohibition of laws 
targeting conduct motivated by religious belief, and in the 
continuing influence of Ballard, all of which demonstrate that the 
Court still considers religious belief deserving of special 
constitutional status. It can also be seen in Watchtower’s heightened 
scrutiny of laws burdening religious speech and in the Court’s 
insistence on keeping public fora open to religious speech, both of 
which demonstrate that the free dissemination of religious ideas 
remains an important constitutional goal. And it can be seen very 
clearly in Hosanna-Tabor, which drew a sharp distinction between 
physical actions motivated by religious teachings and decisions by 
churches that affect the content of their teachings. 
In short, the Court has not abandoned separationism in its Free 
Exercise jurisprudence. It has merely narrowed the church it aims 
to protect. 
 
 175. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (emphasis added); see also id. at 713 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“A religious body’s control over [its ministers] is an essential component of its 
freedom to speak in its own voice, both to its own members and to the outside world. The 
connection between church governance and the free dissemination of religious doctrine has deep 
roots in our legal tradition . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 176. See supra Part III.A. 
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IV. THE NEW SEPARATIONISM: A NARROW CONCEPTION OF 
THE “CHURCH” 
Free Exercise jurisprudence is a useful context for explaining the 
expansion and subsequent contraction of the Court’s understanding 
of the church because the changes in the church’s scope are so easily 
visible in the doctrine: prior to Smith, actions motivated by belief 
were part of the “church”; in Smith, the “church” shrank and 
stopped including them. But the Establishment Clause is more 
strongly associated with separationism, and changes in Establishment 
Clause doctrine are the primary reason most people assume that 
separationism is in decline. If the apparent decline of separationism is 
in fact a narrowing of the Court’s understanding of the church, then 
this narrowing should be able to explain changes in Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence as well as Free Exercise. 
However, the way the shrinking church has influenced 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is somewhat more complicated 
than its influence on Free Exercise Clause cases—in part because 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is just more complicated than 
Free Exercise177—and its similarities to the Court’s early separationist 
decisions are less direct. Whereas the Court’s narrower conception of 
the church has led its Free Exercise doctrine more or less back to 
where it was before the 1960s, the Court’s new Establishment 
Clause doctrine is more like a variation on an earlier theme, a new 
development of ideas that were present in early separationist 
decisions but rejected by the strict separationism of the 1970s. 
The Sections that follow trace this story through the Supreme 
Court’s direct aid cases, while Part V examines indirect aid cases. 
Section IV.A argues that the Court’s early Establishment Clause 
separationism proposed a number of ways of defining the church (for 
direct aid purposes) without settling on one. Section IV.B argues 
that the Court’s strict separationism of the 1970s employed a 
broadened understanding of the church to strike down aid that the 
earlier separationism might have permitted. Finally, Section IV.C 
argues that the Court has since abandoned this effort to broaden the 
church, and that its new, narrower conception of the church has led 
to a loosening of restrictions on aid to religious institutions. 
 
 177. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 111, at 170 (“The Court’s establishment clause 
cases are even more confusing than [its] free exercise cases . . . .”). 
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A. Restricting Aid to Religious Institutions 
Early Establishment Clause separationism shared the goal of its 
Free Exercise cousin: protect the free formation of individual belief. 
What it added was a historical narrative about how the Establishment 
Clause was intended to serve this purpose. This narrative centered 
on the English and colonial governments’ practice of supporting 
ministers out of tax funds and regulating religious teaching and 
practice. According to the narrative, this practice “shock[ed] the 
freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of abhorrence,” leading them 
to the “conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved 
best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to 
support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere 
with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.”178 This 
conviction led to disestablishment in Virginia and then to the 
enactment of the federal Establishment Clause.179 
Though this narrative may not accurately portray the church-
state debates in the 1780s that led to the Establishment Clause,180 it 
does vividly express the Supreme Court’s concerns in the 1940s and 
the following decades. The Court feared that if government were 
allowed to aid religion, it would lead to religious conflict, as religious 
groups would fight to use government to fund their own institutions 
and suppress the religious teachings of other groups.181 The Court 
also opposed government influence on the development of religious 
belief in society,182 and found it immoral that taxpayers’ money 
 
 178. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947). 
 179. Id. at 11–13. 
 180. See Steven K. Green, A “Spacious Conception”: Separationism as an Idea, 85 OR. L. 
REV. 443, 450 (2006); see generally DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE 
WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002); PHILIP HAMBURGER, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2004). 
 181. Everson, 330 U.S. at 9 (“With the power of government supporting them . . . 
Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects 
had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted 
Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time persecuted Jews.”); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962) (Early Americans “knew the anguish, hardship and 
bitter strife that could come when zealous religious groups struggled with one another to 
obtain the Government’s stamp of approval from each King, Queen, or Protector that came to 
temporary power.”).  
 182. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12 (“Almighty God hath created the mind free . . . .”); id. at 
41 n.29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“[T]he same authority which can force a citizen to 
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may 
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?”) (internal quotation 
HURST.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
42 
should be used to support the teaching of religious beliefs—
particularly beliefs with which they disagreed.183 (This last concern 
was particularly important to the strictly separationist dissenting 
Justices.)184 All of these problems pointed toward the same solution: 
a constitutional prohibition on government aid to religion. 
This solution, however, led to a more intractable problem: 
religious people and institutions are not solely religious. They are 
also people and institutions, and as people and institutions not only 
depend on government aid but frequently have a constitutional right 
to it. As Everson put it, government may not permissibly 
hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. 
Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, 
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, 
Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their 
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public 
welfare legislation.185 
The “difficulty” lay “in drawing the line between tax legislation 
which provides funds for the welfare of the general public and that 
which is designed to support institutions which teach religion.”186 In 
other words, the difficulty lay in defining the church from which the 
state had to be kept separate—in distinguishing between situations in 
which aid goes to religion itself, and is therefore impermissible, and 
situations in which aid goes to people or institutions that happen to 
be religious, and is therefore permissible. 
It would not be accurate to say that the Court had no answer to 
this question; indeed, already in Everson it had several answers and 
could not bring itself to say which of them was correct. All of them 
did have one thing in common: like the Court’s Free Exercise 
separationism, each solution presumed that the core of religion was 
 
marks omitted); Engel, 370 U.S. at 429 (“Our Founders were no more willing to let the 
content of their prayers and their privilege of praying whenever they pleased be influenced by 
the ballot box than they were to let these vital matters of personal conscience depend upon the 
succession of monarchs.”).  
 183. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12 (noting that Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance 
“eloquently argued . . . that no person, either believer or non-believer, should be taxed to 
support a religious institution of any kind . . . ”); id. at 13 (“[T]o compel a man to furnish 
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful 
and tyrannical . . . .”).  
 184. Id. at 44–45 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 185. Id. at 16 (majority opinion). 
 186. Id. at 14. 
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the teaching of religious belief, and each aimed to keep government 
separate from the teaching of religious belief.187 But these answers 
took varying approaches to determining when aid was actually going 
to the teaching of religious belief and when it was not. One of these 
possible answers—a distinction between direct and indirect aid—is 
discussed in Part V. The others appear in the paragraphs below. 
Purpose. The Everson Court opposed aid “designed to support 
institutions which teach religion,”188 and its Due Process analysis 
acknowledged that New Jersey’s bus subsidy was “legislation 
intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular 
education” and served a “public purpose.”189 Nevertheless, the 
Court did not suggest that all aid with a secular purpose is 
permissible, and for good reason: the practice of establishing a 
religion for purely political purposes goes back millennia. 
Neutrality. In Everson, the Court emphasized repeatedly that the 
program of aid was neutral with respect to religion, saying that it did 
“no more than provide a general program to help parents get their 
children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and 
from accredited schools.”190 
Writing in dissent, Justice Jackson expressed an understanding of 
separationism that combined the ideas of secular purpose and 
religious neutrality with a pair of vivid examples: 
A policeman protects a Catholic, of course—but not because he is a 
Catholic; it is because he is a man and a member of our society. 
The fireman protects the Church school—but not because it is a 
Church school; it is because it is property, part of the assets of our 
society. Neither the fireman nor the policeman has to ask before he 
renders aid “Is this man or building identified with the 
Catholic Church?”191 
 
 187. This prefigured the Court’s concern in later cases that public aid should not be used 
for religious instruction and that the government itself should not be engaged in religious 
instruction. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel 
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). It also fit the Court’s historical claim that the government-paid 
ministers were among the primary evils the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent. 
 188. Everson, 330 U.S. at 14. 
 189. Id. at 7. 
 190. Id. at 18. 
 191. Id. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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Yet the Court left unclear whether aid to religious institutions 
was always permissible if it had a secular purpose and was religiously 
neutral. Instead, it mentioned at least one more potential criterion 
for distinguishing between permissible and impermissible aid: 
“Marked off from the religious function.” Unlike Justice Jackson, 
the majority saw police and fire protection and the provision of roads 
and public utilities as permissible not merely because they were 
neutral and had a secular purpose, but because they were “separate” 
and “indisputably marked off from the religious function.”192 This 
distinction—between aid closely related to the teaching of religion 
and aid “marked off from” it—would be echoed in the Court’s 
later cases. 
To summarize: the Court’s early separationism aimed to avoid 
religious conflict, to insulate the teaching of religion from 
government influence, and to prevent taxpayers’ money from being 
spent on the teaching of religion. The Court pursued these goals by 
(among other things) announcing restrictions on aid to religious 
institutions, but it did not make clear how to distinguish between aid 
to religion, which was impermissible, and aid to the general public, 
which was permissible even though religious groups would inevitably 
benefit from it. The Everson Court emphasized that, in order to be 
permissible, aid had to be religiously neutral and have.a non-
religious public purpose, but the Court left open the possibility that 
there might be other requirements as well. 
B. Direct Aid: The Lemon and Nyquist Approach 
The conventional understanding of what separationism means 
for direct aid to religious institutions was defined not by Everson, but 
by nine direct aid cases decided between 1971 and 1977. Even in 
these cases, separationism did not mean that all government actions 
that benefitted religion were unconstitutional; rather, even the 
Court’s strictest separationist decisions recognized, as Everson had 
recognized, that the Court’s task was to distinguish between 
permissible and impermissible aid to religious institutions, rather 
than to ban all such aid. Further, as in Everson and in the Court’s 
Free Exercise jurisprudence, the Court considered the formation of 
religious belief to be the heart of the church, and it therefore agreed 
with Everson that the chief evil to be prevented was the funding of 
 
 192. Id. at 18 (majority opinion). 
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religious education. The Court’s motives were even somewhat 
similar, with an emphasis on preventing conflict among 
religious groups. 
The 1970s Court differed from Everson in the way it discerned 
whether aid actually went to religion or merely to people or 
institutions that were involved in religion. Whereas Everson’s analysis 
focused primarily on the aid’s religiously neutral character, with 
secondary emphasis on its indirect nature and legitimate secular 
purpose, Lemon declared that in addition to a secular purpose, 
permissible aid had to have a secular “primary effect” and had to 
avoid “excessive entanglement” with religion.193 These requirements 
were applied in eight more direct aid cases in the space of seven 
years,194 but new cases did more to express the Court’s confusion 
than to resolve it. 
In particular, the primary effect analysis was hopelessly 
indeterminate. For example, would a neutral program distributing 
aid directly to parochial schools have the primary effect of helping 
students or the primary effect of advancing recipient schools’ 
religious purposes? As Eisgruber and Sager have pointed out, the 
answer is unavoidably “both.”195 How would it even be possible to 
aid students at parochial schools without making parochial schools 
more attractive to potential students and thus helping the schools 
fulfill their religious mission? 
 
 193. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 194. The string of cases beginning with Lemon follows, in chronological order: Lemon, 
403 U.S. 602 (invalidating a subsidy for the salaries of teachers of secular subjects at religious 
schools); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding construction grants for secular 
buildings at religious universities); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious 
Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (invalidating reimbursement of certain state-mandated 
administrative costs); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (permitting the issue of revenue 
bonds for religious universities); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (invalidating direct grants for building maintenance at religious 
schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (allowing textbook loans to religious schools, 
but striking down various other kinds of support), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 
(2000); Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (permitting 
construction grants to religious universities); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) 
(allowing some forms of aid but prohibiting others; in particular, prohibiting provision of 
transportation for religious schools’ field trips), overruled by Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793; New York 
v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977) (prohibiting reimbursement of certain state-
mandated record-keeping costs). The third appendix of WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 111, at 
305–38, was invaluable for this research. 
 195. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 31. 
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Despite the confusion, the Court’s definition of the church from 
which government had to be kept separate began to develop certain 
contours. Decisions turned primarily on two questions. The first was 
whether the recipient was pervasively sectarian, meaning that its 
religious and secular functions could not be separated from each 
other. If the school was not pervasively sectarian, then its secular 
functions could be funded so long as the funding had a secular 
purpose and was religiously neutral.196 But if the recipient was 
pervasively sectarian, then it was effectively always part of the 
religious sphere, always a religion and never an institution that 
merely happened to be religious. Whether aid to such an institution 
was permissible depended on the second question: whether the 
nature of the aid was such that it could not be converted to religious 
use—an echo of Everson’s idea of aid “indisputably marked off from 
the religious function.”197 If the aid could be used only for non-
religious purposes, such as distribution of secular textbooks to 
religious schools, then the aid was permissible.198 
These two questions had the virtue of diverting attention from 
the intractable problems of the “primary effect” analysis, but they 
put the focus squarely on the Court’s understanding of religion and 
the church, which the Court failed to articulate coherently. How 
exactly could courts distinguish between a religious charity’s secular 
and religious functions? Religious charities often do not perceive any 
of their work as secular,199 and they may consider all of their efforts 
to be part of preaching their religion. Likewise, if a court concluded 
that an institution was pervasively sectarian, how could it tell 
whether aid could be put to religious use? In both of these issues, 
the Court’s answer was to understand religion (as it had in Everson) 
as sectarian belief, and to try to prevent governments from being too 
closely associated with the propagation of sectarian belief.200 
Yet this was insufficient to distinguish reliably between sacred 
and secular, especially in the context of pervasively sectarian 
 
 196. See Roemer, 426 U.S. 736; McNair, 413 U.S. 734; Tilton, 403 U.S. 672; Esbeck, 
supra note 4, at 10; Stephen V. Monsma, The “Pervasively Sectarian” Standard in Theory and 
Practice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 323 (1999). 
 197. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.  
 198. See Meek, 421 U.S. 349. 
 199. See, e.g., Ten Ways Catholic Charities Are Catholic, CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA, 
http://catholiccharitiesusa.org/mission-faith/catholic-values/ (“The work we do has its roots 
deep in the scriptures.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
HURST.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:13 PM 
1 The Very Old New Separationism 
 47 
institutions. The Court’s efforts to define “pervasively sectarian” led 
to “an uncertain, wavering standard that . . . [was] applied in a 
sporadic, inconsistent manner”201 In practice, it seemed that 
religiously affiliated elementary and secondary schools were 
pervasively sectarian, while religiously affiliated colleges and 
universities were not,202 but it was unclear from the Court’s 
reasoning why that should be the case. Worse, the decisions 
concerning the sorts of aid that could not be converted to religious 
purposes led to some of the worst confusion in the history of 
Religion Clause jurisprudence, including the famously nonsensical 
holding in Wolman v. Walter that state governments may give 
religious schools books, but not maps.203 As Senator Moynihan 
quipped, what would the Court have said about “atlases, which are 
books of maps?”204 
The “pervasively sectarian” doctrine also proved problematic 
because it seemed to require not just discrimination between 
religious and secular institutions—separationism has always required 
that—but discrimination among religious institutions based on how 
much they chose to integrate their religious beliefs into their work, a 
sort of discrimination much more difficult to square with 
separationist principles, and one with an embarrassing anti-Catholic 
past.205 It also required courts to investigate institutions’ religious 
beliefs and how much those beliefs were reflected in their practices—
hardly the sort of inquiry a court committed to separating church 
and state should be comfortable with.206 
In short, most of the difficulties in the Court’s strict 
separationism arose not from the idea of separationism nor from the 
principle that government should not pay for religious instruction 
but from the Court’s particular approach to distinguishing between 
aid to religion and aid to people who happen to be religious. In 
particular, the difficulties arose from the Court’s theologically 
dubious attempt to distinguish between institutions that are 
pervasively religious and institutions that are only partially religious, 
 
 201. Monsma, supra note 196, at 325. 
 202. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 11. 
 203. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 255. 
 204. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 32. 
 205. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2002) (plurality opinion). 
 206. Id. 
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and from its economically dubious attempt to discern whether aid 
could be put to a religious purpose. 
C. Direct Aid and Religious Speech: Modern Version 
Since the 1980s, the Court’s “pervasively sectarian” distinction 
has fallen apart. The doctrine’s influence began diminishing in the 
1980s, when the Court declined to apply it in a number of cases to 
which it was arguably relevant.207 In 2000, the plurality opinion of 
Mitchell v. Helms explicitly repudiated it,208 and it has not been 
mentioned by any of the Court’s majority or plurality opinions since. 
By abandoning the “pervasively sectarian” doctrine, the Court in 
effect narrowed the religious sphere. No longer are any institutions 
so pervaded with religion that they have to be treated as religious all 
the time—all religiously affiliated institutes are recognized to have 
both religious and non-religious elements, and every institution is 
treated as religious when it is teaching its sectarian beliefs and as 
secular when it is not. This principle allows churches to be just 
buildings when seen by the fire department and just crime victims 
when protected by the police, and also to remain religious 
organizations whose religious beliefs the government must not 
interfere with or promote. In other words, the abandonment of the 
pervasively sectarian doctrine is easily reconciled with Everson. 
Likewise, the Court has largely abandoned its futile attempts to 
distinguish between aid that can be put to religious purposes and aid 
that cannot. Once the Court’s efforts in this area had tied its 
doctrine thoroughly in knots,209 it increasingly concluded that only 
 
 207. See id. at 826–27. 
 208. Id. at 829. 
 209. In 1985, Justice Rehnquist described the chaos as follows:  
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that contain 
maps of the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the United States for 
use in geography class. A State may lend textbooks on American colonial history, 
but it may not lend a film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in 
history class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend workbooks 
in which the parochial school children write, thus rendering them nonreusable. A 
State may pay for bus transportation to religious schools but may not pay for bus 
transportation from the parochial school to the public zoo or natural history 
museum for a field trip. A State may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the 
parochial school but therapeutic services must be given in a different building; 
speech and hearing “services” conducted by the State inside the sectarian school are 
forbidden . . . but the State may conduct speech and hearing diagnostic testing 
inside the sectarian school. . . . Exceptional parochial school students may receive 
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the lack of a secular purpose or failure to be religiously neutral made 
an aid program impermissible. Now the government can pay for 
remedial instruction in secular subjects on religious school 
campuses210 and lend instructional materials to religious schools for 
use in their secular curriculum.211 So long as the aid has a secular 
purpose and is religiously neutral, it is not constitutionally invalid. 
“The question,” according to the Mitchell plurality, “is ultimately a 
question whether any religious indoctrination that occurs in those 
schools could reasonably be attributed to governmental action.”212 
Both of these doctrinal developments are commonly taken as 
evidence that the Court has repudiated separationism. But in fact, 
the Court has only repudiated a single problematic approach to 
determining whether the state was impermissibly aiding the 
church—an approach the Court did not adopt before the 1970s and 
already began retreating from in the 1980s. And once the Court had 
retreated, the core of Everson’s separationism remained: a 
requirement that all aid have a secular purpose and a requirement 
that it be religiously neutral. 
V. THE NEW SEPARATIONISM: RECOGNIZING “THE INSTITUTIONS 
OF PRIVATE CHOICE” 
Perhaps the most controversial element of the Court’s supposed 
repudiation of separationism is the Court’s increasing willingness to 
allow the government to subsidize students’ tuition to religious 
private schools. The Court’s 1970s separationism strictly forbade this 
sort of aid on the grounds that it paid for religious as well as secular 
instruction.213 Even the Everson Court would likely have balked 
before a neutral subsidy that helped students pay their parochial 
 
counseling, but it must take place outside of the parochial school, such as in a trailer 
parked down the street. . . . A State may give cash to a parochial school to pay for 
the administration of state-written tests and state-ordered reporting services, but it 
may not provide funds for teacher-prepared tests on secular subjects.” 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110–11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
 210. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 211. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 793. 
 212. Id. at 809. 
 213. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 
(1973) (invalidating a tuition reimbursement program because “[t]here has been no endeavor 
to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions and to ensure 
that State financial aid supports only the former”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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school tuition, despite all its emphasis on neutrality and despite the 
transportation subsidy it approved having a similar (if smaller) effect. 
The Court’s willingness to allow such aid is one of the strongest 
pieces of evidence for the conventional narrative. 
Nevertheless, the Court’s new willingness to allow indirect aid to 
religious institutions can be defended both as consistent with 
separationism and as a development of ideas implicit in the Court’s 
earliest separationist cases: Everson and Board of Education v. Allen.214 
The metaphor of separating church and state does not preclude the 
possibility of there being a middle ground between the two; there 
may be entities in society that are neither part of the church nor the 
state, and which do not need to be separated from either of them. If 
such entities are recognized, then they may interact freely with both 
the church and the state without violating the separation of church 
and state. Everson and Allen recognized the possible importance of 
such entities, and it was not until the 1970s that the Court began 
striking down aid that was passed through intermediaries in this 
manner. Contrary to the conventional narrative, the rejection of the 
1970s’ approach was not a rejection of separationism itself, but a 
return to and redevelopment of an older separationism. 
A. The Theoretical Possibility, and Practical Necessity, of a 
Middle Ground 
Among the important implications of the separation metaphor is 
that, for purposes of separating church and state, “church” and 
“state” are not necessarily collectively exhaustive categories. There 
remains the possibility of some entities that do not need to be 
separated from either church or state. Expressed in terms of 
separationism’s spatial metaphor, these phenomena could be 
conceived of as the middle ground between church and state, a place 
where both church and state can be active without 
implicating separationism. 
Admittedly, separationist reasoning both on the Court and in 
scholarship has not generally recognized the possibility of middle 
ground between church and state. Instead, when the Court or 
scholars have applied the metaphor of separation, they have usually 
described differences between possible approaches to separationism 
in terms of how absolute separation needs to be, how high 
 
 214. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
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Jefferson’s “wall of separation” needs to be, where the wall should 
be, and so forth, without talking about how church and state relate 
to the rest of society.215 Further, both the Court and scholars have 
sometimes used “public” and “private” to describe the government 
and religious spheres respectively,216 and there is not obviously a 
middle ground between public and private the way there may 
potentially be between church and state. But there are several 
persistent aspects of separationist reasoning that can best be 
understood as assuming the existence of a middle ground, and these 
aspects were visible from the early years of the Court’s separationism. 
The most important of these aspects is the Court’s recognition, 
even in its most separationist decisions, that the separation of church 
and state cannot be absolute.217 As the Court recognized as early as 
Everson, religion and government will inevitably interact in a variety 
of ways, not all of which implicate separationism.218 One of the chief 
categories of church-state interaction that are commonly understood 
to be permissible is interaction that is mediated by civil society. 
I illustrate with two examples of church-state interactions that 
could not possibly be considered contrary to separationism, or at 
least to any form of separationism that could ever be plausible in the 
United States. The first example occurs when government employees 
or welfare recipients choose to donate money to churches. In this 
case, the money being donated clearly comes from the government, 
since all of the donor’s money comes from the government, and it is 
clearly given to religion. Of course, the government does not give 
the money to the donor for the purpose of having it donated to a 
church, but it pays its employees and the beneficiaries of its social 
 
 215. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 22. 
 216. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992) (“[P]reservation and 
transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the 
private sphere.”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962) (“[R]eligion is too personal, too 
sacred, too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”); Denise 
Meyerson, Why Religion Belongs in the Private Sphere, Not the Public Square, in LAW AND 
RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 44, 44–71 (Peter Cane, Carolyn 
Evans & Zoe Robinson, eds. 2009). 
 217. See, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 760 (“It has never been thought either possible or 
desirable to enforce a regime of total separation.”); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 
(1971) (“[T]otal separation is not possible in an absolute sense.”). 
 218. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947) (arguing that the First 
Amendment does not aim to completely sever the benefits of any public service from 
religious institutions). 
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programs knowing that many will pass some of that money along to 
churches, where the money will be used for religious purposes. 
The second example is the influence of religion on elections by 
way of voters’ religious beliefs. Although legislation passed for 
exclusively religious reasons is unconstitutional,219 the stricter 
Rawlsian idea that political arguments must be based on public 
reason has never become part of the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence.220 Nor indeed could it. Under the Free Speech Clause, 
citizens have a constitutional right to make whatever political 
arguments they wish, regardless of the arguments’ religious or 
irreligious character.221 Citizens may vote based on whatever criteria 
they choose, including a candidate’s religious identity or the 
perceived agreement between the candidate’s ideology and the 
citizens’ religious beliefs. Conversely, candidates have a right to make 
their religious identity known and to choose platforms consistent 
with their own or their constituents’ religion. If the candidates are 
elected, they may be influenced by religion so long as they can also 
give secular reasons for their actions.222 
One way of understanding why these two examples are 
permissible is to explain them as a compromise. Under this 
approach, these examples are contrary to separationism, but they 
must be permitted for the sake of other constitutional values. 
Government employees must be allowed to donate to religious 
groups because banning such contributions would be discriminatory 
and infringe on several First Amendment rights: Free Exercise, Free 
Speech, and Freedom of Association. Religion must be permitted to 
influence politics by way of voters’ religious beliefs because the Free 
 
 219. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (holding that statutes “must have a secular 
legislative purpose”). 
 220. Compare JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EXPANDED EDITION 212–47 
(1993) (arguing that ideal public discourse about political issues excludes references to 
religious concepts, doctrines, and values), with McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 
(1961) (holding that laws requiring the cessation of commerce on Sundays did not violate 
the Establishment Clause because they served secular purposes apart from their original 
religious purposes). 
 221. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“It is 
axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the 
message it conveys.”). 
 222. See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445 (“Sunday Closing Laws, like those before us, 
have become part and parcel of this great governmental concern wholly apart from their 
original [religious] purposes or connotations. The present purpose and effect of most of them 
is to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens.”). 
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Speech Clause does not permit the government to censor religiously 
based political arguments or to require voters to vote based on 
public reason (perhaps by requiring them to swear an oath to that 
effect when they register). This approach has some intuitive appeal 
because separationism, if it is a constitutional value, must of course 
coexist with other constitutional values. 
But a better way of understanding these examples is that they do 
not violate separationism even in principle. As I suggested in Section 
II.B, there is nothing about the metaphor “separation of church and 
state” that requires the categories “church” and “state” to include 
everything. If we recognize the existence of a middle ground, which 
is by definition neither religion nor government but may interact 
with both, then we can conceive of both of these examples as 
involving the middle ground rather than direct interactions between 
church and state. In the case of government employees’ religious 
donations, the government gives money not to religion but to free 
private citizens, and religion receives money not from the 
government but from these free private citizens. In the case of 
voters’ religious motivations, we can conceive of religion not as 
influencing government, but as influencing free private citizens who 
are then free to influence the government. These citizens act as a 
buffer, a neutral zone, a way of mediating interactions between 
government and religion while keeping the church and state separate 
(whatever “church” and “state” mean in one’s particular 
understanding of separationism). 
But if this is the case, then how do we tell when the middle 
ground effectively stands between church and state? This will depend 
on just what one understands “church” and “state” to be, since the 
middle ground must by definition be neither church nor state. But 
the examples above suggest that a defining characteristic of the 
middle ground is the presence of free, private choice.223 The reason 
government employees can donate money they have received from 
the government to churches is that they, not the government, 
choose to make the donations. The reasons voters can vote based on 
their religious beliefs is that they choose whether to be persuaded by 
 
 223. The Supreme Court itself alludes to this characteristic: “The Constitution decrees 
that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of 
private choice.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625 (emphasis added). Cf. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 7 (“So 
long as individuals may freely choose or not choose religion, merely enabling private decisions 
logically cannot be a governmental establishment of religion.”). 
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religious arguments or not—at no point does religion itself, however 
defined, actually dictate which candidate they will vote for, and at no 
point does a religious organization gain actual authority 
over government. 
Defining civil society in terms of free private choice also helps 
explain the persistent connection between separationism and 
neutrality. There seems to be no reason in principle why separating 
church and state would require the government to be neutral 
between religion and non-religion. Indeed, it seems to require the 
opposite: as Eisgruber and Sager point out, separating religion from 
government requires government to treat religion both better and 
worse than non-religion, since non-religion does not need to be 
separated from government and therefore does not have the special 
rights and disabilities that come with separation.224 
Yet as early as Everson, the Court already associated separation 
with the idea that government may neither “handicap” nor “favor” 
religions,225 nor “aid all religions.”226 There are many reasons to 
associate this idea with separationism—one of which figures 
prominently in Part IV above—but one important reason derives 
from free private choice as a characteristic of civil society. 
If free private choice is necessary for private citizens to insulate 
religion and government from each other, then any government 
actions that restrict free private choice take private citizens out of the 
equation, thereby bringing church and state into direct contact with 
each other and potentially violating separationism. A law subsidizing 
government employees’ donations to religious organizations but not 
to other charities would thus violate the separation of church and 
state, as would a requirement that voters take an oath promising to 
vote based on religious teachings rather than purely secular 
reasoning, or a religious test insuring that only candidates of a 
particular religious identity could be elected.227 Neutrality between 
religion and non-religion thus supports separation of church and 
 
 224. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 29. 
 225. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
 226. Id. at 15. 
 227. Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493–94 (1961) (appealing to separationism 
to strike down religious tests for office). 
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state by preserving free private choice and allowing “the institutions 
of private choice” to insulate church and state from each other.228 
B. Expanding the Middle Ground; Shrinking Separationism 
Separationism has become less important in the Court’s 
jurisprudence because the Court has been increasingly willing to see 
interactions between religion and government as mediated by private 
choice and therefore not implicating separationism. Without being 
repudiated, separationism thus becomes less important simply 
because it decides fewer cases. 
To be more specific, one of the doctrinal developments that has 
been given as evidence of separationism’s decline is the series of 
cases, beginning in 1983 with Mueller v. Allen,229 permitting greater 
indirect aid to religious schools—that is, aid given to individuals 
rather than directly to the schools themselves.230 Scholars who use 
these cases as evidence of separationism’s decline assume that 
indirect aid to religious schools violates separationism,231 but that is 
not necessarily the case. It depends in large part on whether one’s 
conception of separationism permits private choice to act as a buffer 
between religion and government and on how one defines 
private choice. 
Prior to separationism’s decline, the Court heard only four 
indirect aid cases, upholding indirect aid in Everson and Board of 
Education v. Allen232 before striking it down in Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist233 and Sloan v. Lemon.234 Importantly, all four of 
these cases presented themselves as consistent with separation of 
church and state—in particular, Everson and Allen did not consider 
indirect aid to religion a departure from separation of church and 
 
 228. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625. Cf. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 7 (“In situations of indirect 
assistance [to religion], the equal treatment of religion—not separationism—is the Court’s 
operative rule for interpreting the Establishment Clause.”). 
 229. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983). 
 230. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 8, at 242 (presenting the Court’s decision to allow states 
to make private school tuition tax deductible as part of “a process of repudiation of Lemon in 
the very aid-to-parochial-schools context in which it originated”). I borrow the term “indirect 
aid” from Carl Esbeck. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 7. 
 231. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 8, at 242; Esbeck, supra note 4, at 7. 
 232. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
 233. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
 234. 413 U.S. 825 (1973). 
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state.235 Everson itself, the case that introduced the phrase “separation 
between church and state” into modern constitutional law, was 
especially emphatic on this point: “[The] wall between church and 
state . . . must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve 
the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it here.”236 
Of these four cases, Everson makes the greatest use of the idea of 
civil society as a middle ground between church and state. Although 
the Everson Court did not draw any clear line between the types of 
aid to religion that violate separationism and those that do not, its 
attempt to reconcile New Jersey’s aid program with the separationist 
principles it endorsed relied on the same two points that defined my 
discussion of the middle ground above. First, although the Court 
acknowledged that religious schools might benefit from the 
program,237 it emphasized that the aid was not actually distributed to 
religious schools: “The State contributes no money to the schools. It 
does not support them.”238 Second, the Court emphasized that the 
money was given to individuals on neutral terms, leaving them free 
to spend it religiously or otherwise: “[This] legislation, as applied, 
does no more than provide a general program to help parents get 
their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to 
and from accredited schools.”239 In other words, the Court 
permitted the aid in part because it was distributed to private 
individuals and only benefited religion through individuals’ free 
choice to use it at a religious school rather than a secular one. 
But the Court did not hold that aid distributed to private 
individuals is always permissible, and the Court’s next three indirect 
 
 235. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Allen, 392 U.S. at 242; 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 795; Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. at 832 (holding, based on Lemon’s 
separationist reasoning, that the aid in question was impermissible). 
 236. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. Of course, the Court’s emphatic assertion has not 
persuaded everyone. Justice Jackson joked that the Court, while “whispering I will ne’er 
consent,—consented.” Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also SEHAT, supra note 40, at 236 (“The majority’s argument consisted largely of a ringing 
endorsement of church-state separation as a way to prove its concern for the concept while at 
the same time affirming a connection between religion and the state.”). 
 237. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17 (“It is undoubtedly true that children are helped to get to 
church schools. There is even a possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the 
church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children’s bus fares out of their 
own pockets.”). 
 238. Id. at 18. 
 239. Id. (emphasis added). 
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aid decisions would gradually abandon Everson’s focus on 
civil society. 
In the next indirect aid case, Board of Education v. Allen, civil 
society analysis reminiscent of Everson still played an important 
role,240 helping the Court conclude that lending secular textbooks to 
students at parochial schools did indeed have a secular purpose.241 
But there were already signs of civil society’s diminished influence. 
Most importantly, the Court left open the possibility that if the 
secular textbooks had been proven to aid schools’ religious 
instruction, the outcome might have been different.242 This marked a 
departure from Everson, where obviously the bus money given to 
students helped them receive religious instruction as well as secular. 
Nyquist and Sloan, decided on the same day in 1973, both 
addressed state programs that subsidized parents’ expenditures on 
private school tuition,243 and both used the Lemon test to invalidate 
the tuition subsidies.244 Sloan did not cite Everson or Allen’s civil 
society reasoning at all, while Nyquist devoted a lengthy passage to 
distinguishing it.245 
According to Nyquist,that the state gave money to parents rather 
than directly to the schools weighed in favor of constitutionality, but 
it was “only one among many factors to be considered” in 
determining whether the aid’s primary effect advanced or inhibited 
religion.246 The Nyquist Court argued that the aid in Everson and 
Allen was “indisputably marked off from the religious function” in a 
way that tuition subsidies could not be, even though the 
transportation subsidy in Everson helped students receive religious 
instruction as well as secular.247 That the parents were the primary 
beneficiaries did not ultimately matter because helping the parents 
 
 240. 392 U.S. 236, 243–44 (1968) (“[N]o funds or books are furnished to parochial 
schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.”). 
 241. Id. 
 242. See id. at 248 (dismissing an argument based on the textbooks’ supposed usefulness 
for religious teaching because the necessary facts had not been established—not because the 
issue was legally irrelevant). 
 243. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 764 (1973); 
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 837 (1973). Nyquist also concerned a direct subsidy to 
religious schools for building maintenance, 413 U.S. at 762–64, but as it is not relevant to my 
civil society analysis, I will not discuss it here. 
 244. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772–73; Sloan, 413 U.S. at 828–830. 
 245. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780–87. 
 246. Id. at 781. 
 247. Id. at 782 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)). 
HURST.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
58 
helped the schools;248 it was the effect on religion that mattered, 
even if the effect was indirect. And the idea that the parents’ free 
choice to send their children to religious schools might sufficiently 
insulate religion from government was dismissed out of hand: 
The parent is not a mere conduit, we are told, but is absolutely free 
to spend the money he receives in any manner he wishes. There is 
no element of coercion attached to the reimbursement, and no 
assurance that the money will eventually end up in the hands of 
religious schools. The absence of any element of coercion, however, is 
irrelevant to questions arising under the Establishment Clause.249 
Nyquist thus rejected the idea that the free choice of members of 
civil society provides sufficient insulation between religion and 
government for separationist purposes. What mattered was how 
much religion benefited in the end, not whether the benefit to 
religion really came from the government and not from the parents. 
But the Court has never again restricted indirect aid as it did in 
Nyquist and Sloan, and a mere ten years later in Mueller, the Court 
used civil society reasoning to uphold a tuition subsidy, this time in 
the form of a tax deduction instead of vouchers and tax credits. Like 
Nyquist, Mueller applied the Lemon test,250 but key to the Mueller 
Court’s reasoning was that “under Minnesota’s arrangement public 
funds become available [to religious institutions] only as a result of 
numerous private choices of individual parents of school-age 
children.”251 This would become a common theme in the Court’s 
indirect aid cases. In Witters in 1987, the Court pointed out that 
“[a]ny aid provided under Washington’s program that ultimately 
flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the 
genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.”252 In 
Zobrest in 1993, the Court cited Mueller’s and Witters’s language 
about private choice and declared, “That same reasoning applies with 
equal force here.”253 In Zelman in 2002, the Court claimed that 
our jurisprudence with respect to true private choice programs has 
remained consistent and unbroken. Three times we have 
 
 248. Id. at 783. 
 249. Id. at 786 (emphasis added). 
 250. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983). 
 251. Id. at 399. 
 252. Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986). 
 253. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1993). 
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confronted Establishment Clause challenges to neutral government 
programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals, 
who, in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of 
their own choosing. Three times we have rejected 
such challenges.254 
Most recently, in 2011, Arizona Christian School Tuition 
Organization v. Winn demonstrated the continued vitality of civil 
society reasoning by using it to limit taxpayer standing, pointing out 
that the religious schools in question did not receive funds from 
government but from “the decisions of private taxpayers regarding 
their own funds.”255 
Again, the common interpretation of these developments is to 
see them as repudiations of separationism, and certainly there is 
some evidence for that conclusion—in particular, the Justices who 
have supported indirect aid have often supported non-separationist 
outcomes in other cases.256 But seeing the cases that loosen 
restrictions on indirect aid as nothing but repudiations of 
separationism means failing to see the conflict within separationism 
where indirect aid is concerned. It means assuming that Nyquist 
represents the sole correct separationist position on indirect aid 
without acknowledging that other cases have upheld indirect aid 
regimes on explicitly separationist grounds, usually by concluding 
that the aid to religion in question really came from civil society and 
not from government. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF SEPARATIONISM 
Separationism is not dead. Religion in general may no longer be 
separated from government to the extent it once was, but religious 
belief still receives special constitutional protection. This special 
protection for religious belief leads to special constitutional status for 
the practices and institutions through which religious belief is 
 
 254. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002). The “three times” the 
Court mentions are Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest. Id. Apparently the Court did not consider 
Everson, Mueller, Zelman, or Sloan “true private choice programs.” 
 255. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1439 (2011). 
 256. For example, Chief Justice Burger dissented in Committee for Public Education & 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 805 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and joined 
the Mueller v. Allen majority, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), and he also wrote the non-separationist 
majority opinion in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Similarly, Justice Rehnquist 
joined the Mueller majority only two years before launching a frontal attack on separationism 
in his Wallace v. Jaffree dissent. 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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formed. This special status still gives these institutions special rights 
under the Free Exercise Clause and special disabilities under the 
Establishment Clause: the government’s ability to regulate religious 
speech and institutions is specially curtailed, and it is still specially 
prohibited from involving itself in the teaching of religion. 
The difference between the Court’s religion jurisprudence in the 
1970s and its jurisprudence today is not that the 1970s Court was 
committed to separationism and the current Court is not. Instead, 
today’s Court’s separationism is narrower because it is committed to 
a narrower conception of the church from which the state needs to 
be separated. In Free Exercise jurisprudence, the state no longer 
needs to be separated from all actions motivated by religious belief, 
but rather only from those necessary for the formation of 
religious belief. 
Under the Establishment Clause, the Court no longer recognizes 
some institutions as being “pervasively” religious. Instead, it 
recognizes that all religious people and organizations are, for some 
purposes, just people and organizations, and that they may therefore 
be aided and supported by the state without regard to their religion. 
The state may not, however, aid them without a secular purpose, 
since giving them money in order to encourage the teaching of 
religion would involve the state in the teaching of religion. 
Likewise, because the free choice of private citizens to choose 
religious rather than non-religious education cannot be attributed to 
a neutral state aid program, the state may freely subsidize private 
citizens’ choices so long as the subsidies are neutral. Thus, the 
Court’s emphasis on neutrality, far from supplanting separationism, 
is actually an approach to implementing separationism that can 
already be seen in the Everson decision. 
In reality, the strict separationism whose death has been 
mourned by some and celebrated by others was only a brief phase in 
separationism’s long history on the Court—a phase that, if it is to be 
considered superior to this one, must say more for itself than that it 
is the inevitable logical conclusion of an American tradition of 
church and state. It is not. If there is such a tradition, the Court’s 
present separationism is arguably more faithful to it than the 
1970s’ model. 
I admit, I have my reservations about even the best 
separationism as an all-encompassing theory of the Religion Clauses. 
Separationism is too individualistic, too focused on religion as a 
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matter of belief—in short, too Protestant for my decidedly non-
Protestant religious commitments, which are focused more on ritual, 
practice, and community than the Supreme Court’s religion 
jurisprudence has tended to be. But the freedom to believe is 
nevertheless precious, and the Court’s current separationism really 
does protect it more than a pure neutrality regime would. As far as it 
goes, I hope it lasts. 
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